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Recent Cases
ADMISSIBILITY OF JUVENILE'S STATEMENTS IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
State v. Sinderson1
On March 6, 1967, 14 year old Robert Eugene Sinderson, accompanied
by his mother and uncle, turned himself over to the Joplin police department. Prior to interrogation, the juvenile officer and a police officer
informed the defendant, his mother and uncle of his constitutional rights
under the fifth and sixth amendments. 2 The defendant waived his rights,
and this waiver was affirmed by his mother.3 Interrogation was conducted
by the juvenile officer and the police. At no time did the juvenile officer
interview or interrogate the defendant outside the presence of the police
officers. His mother and uncle were informed that they could remain with
the defendant at all times. The interrogation continued for about four
hours, resulting in the defendant's signed statement.
At a subsequent hearing the juvenile court found that the defendant
was not a proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Code and
that he should be prosecuted under the general criminal law.4 Sinderson
was then tried and convicted of first degree robbery.5 The trial court found
the statement made by the defendant on March 6 to be voluntary and
admitted it into evidence. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction, holding that the interrogation of Sinderson by police officers in conjunction with the juvenile officer was not a violation of section
1. 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970).
2. The statement read to defendant, his mother and uncle was that required
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. A statement of waiver was signed by the defendant, and witnessed by his
mother and uncle, and by the juvenile officer and police officer. State v. Sinderson,
455 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Mo. 1970).
4. § 211.071, RSMo 1969, provides:
In the discretion of the judge of the juvenile court, when any petition
under this chapter alleges that a child of the age of fourteen years or older
has committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an
adult, or that the child has violated a state or municipal traffic law or
ordinance or that a minor between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one
years over whom the juvenile court has jurisdiction has violated any state
law or municipal ordinance, the petition may be dismissed and such child
or minor may be prosecuted under the general law, whenever the judge
after receiving the report of the investigation required by this chapter
and hearing evidence finds that such child or minor is not a proper subject
to be dealt with under the provisions of this chapter.
5. After transfer to criminal court, defendant had at first been charged with
first degree murder, but the trial resulted in a hung jury. Thereafter, a grand jury
indicted him on a charge of robbery in the first degree. This matter was referred
by the circuit court to the juvenile court, which again transferred defendant to
the circuit court for prosecution under the general criminal law. State v. Sinderson,
455 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Mo. 1970).
(882)
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211.061 (1) of the Juvenile Code, 6 and that the admission of the defendant's

statement into evidence was not barred by section 211.271 (3) of the Juvenile Code as it existed at the time the defendant was tried.7 The court re-

fused to adopt an absolute prohibition as to statements made by juveniles
to juvenile officers. Instead, it held that a confession made by a juvenile
to a juvenile officer, not rendered inadmissible on state or federal constitutional grounds, may be used against the juvenile in a prosecution under

the general criminal law subsequent to waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. 8
The juvenile court systems in the United States were established as a
result of a reform which began early in the twentieth century.9 The sys6. § 211.061 (1), RSMo 1969 provides:
When a child is taken into custody with or without warrant for an
offense, the child together with any information concerning him and the
personal property found in his possession, shall be taken immediately and
directly before the juvenile court or delivered to the juvenile officer or
person acting for him.
7. § 211.271 (3), RSMo 1959, which was in effect at the time of Sinderson's
trial, provided:
Evidence given in cases under sections 211.011 to 211.431 is not lawful
or proper evidence against the child for any purpose whatever in a civil,
criminal or other proceeding except in subsequent cases under sections
211.011 to 211.431.
This section was amended as of October 13, 1969. § 211.271 (3), RSMo 1969 now
provides:
After a child is taken into custody as provided in section 211.131, all admissions, confessions, and statements by the child to the juvenile officer
and juvenile court personnel and all evidence given in cases under this
chapter, as well as all reports and records of the juvenile court, are not
lawful or proper evidence against the child and shall not be used for any
purpose whatsoever in any proceeding, civil or criminal, other than proceedings under this chapter.
8. State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 493-95 (Mo. 1970).
Aside from statutory exclusions, the admissibility of a juvenile's confession
is dependant upon his being informed of his rights under the fifth and sixth amendments (see cases cited note 15 infra) and upon his voluntary waiver of these rights.
Most courts strengthen the presumption against waiver to take into account the
lack of maturity of the child and look to the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the waiver to determine its validity. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962) (confession held inadmissible); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
(confession held inadmissible); People v. Johnson, 70 Cal. 2d 469, 450 P.2d 265,
74 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969) (confession held inadmissible); People v. Lara, 67 Cal.
2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968)
(confession held admissible); People v. Robinson, 274 Cal. App. 2d 514, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 213 (1969) (confession held admissible); People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237
N.E.2d 466 (1968), petition for cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 660 (1970) (confession
held admissible); State v. Taylor, 456 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1970) (waiver of counsel
prior to lineup held voluntary); In re Nelson, 58 Misc. 2d 748, 296 N.Y.S.2d 472
(N.Y. City Fain. Ct. 1969) (confession held inadmissible); Commonwealth v. Tabb,
433 Pa. 204, 249 A.2d 546 (1969) (confession held inadmissible). See also cases
collected, Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 624 (1963); Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights
by Minors: A Question of Law or Fact?, 19 HAsT. L.J. 223 (1957).
9. The first juvenile court act was passed in Illinois in 1899. R. PERXINS,
CRnMINAL LAW 841 (2d ed. 1969). For a general historic survey see Parker, Some
Historical Observations on the Juvenile Court, 9 CRiu. L.Q. 467 (1967); Nicholas,
History Philosophy and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FA.i. L. 151 (1961).
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tern has developed on the premise that the state stands in the role of parens
patriaetoward the wayward juvenile. 10 In juvenile cases, the state, as parens
patriae, was given the task not to determine the guilt or innocence of the
child, but rather "what had best be done in his interest and in the interest
of the state to save him from a downward career."'I In this process criminal
stigma was to be avoided and the juvenile spared the experience of a criminal trial. 12 According to this theory a juvenile was not accused of a specific
crime and was not placed on trial; therefore the rights of an accused did
not arise.' 3 However, beginning with the landmark case of In re Gault,14
juvenile offenders were granted many of the rights of an adult criminal. 15
Initial jurisdiction by the juvenile court, however, does not always
insure the juvenile offender complete insulation from criminal prosecution. In certain instances the juvenile court may exercise its statutory
authority and waive jurisdiction over the child and thereby subject him
to the normal criminal processes.' 6 Since the overall atmosphere of juvenile
court investigations and proceedings are nonpunitive, 17 the juvenile offender is encouraged to speak freely with officers of the court.' 8 A later
waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court could place the juvenile in the
10. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1965); State v. Couch, 294
S.W.2d 636, 639 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956). See also In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109
A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955). The term parens patriae is
defined as the father or parent of his country; in England, the King; in America,
the people. The government is thus spoken of in relation to its duty to protect
and control minor children and guard their interests. Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa
296, 312, 41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950).
11. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAxv. L. Rlv. 104, 119-20 (1909).
12. State v. Tolias, 326 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Mo. 1959); In re C--,
314 S.W.2d

756, 760 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). For discussion of the development of the juvenile
court concept see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 841 (2d ed. 1969); Note, The Parens

Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile 'Court
Powers, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 894 (1966). Those jurisdictions holding that proceed-

ings in a juvenile court are not criminal prosecutions are listed in Pee v. United

States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
13. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Yonick v. Briggs, 266 F. 434 (W.D. Pa.

1920); State v. Heath, 352 Mo. 1147, 1150, 181 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1944); Ex parte

Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 726, 41 S.W.2d 176, 178 (En Banc 1931); Minor Children
of F.B. v. Caruthers, 323 S.W.2d 397, 400 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); In re Holmes,
379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
14. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the states provide notice of
hearing and charges, the right to counsel, the privilege against self incrimination,
and the right to confrontation to a juvenile in a proceeding in which he is threatened with a deprivation of his liberty; see Katcham, Guidelinesfrom Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Re-appraisal,53 VA. L. REv. 1700 (1967).

15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), held that due process requires proof

beyond a reasonable doubt during the ajudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding which may result in the juvenile's confinement. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, U.S. -, 91 St.Ct. 1976 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a juvenile
was not entitled to a trial by jury in juvenile proceedings. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d
1241 (1965).
16. See § 211.071, RSMo 1969, quoted note 4 supra.
17. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959); State v. Harold,
364 Mo. 1052, 1055, 271 S.W.2d 527, 529 (1954).
18. E.g., State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1970).
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precarious position of having his prior statements to the juvenile officer
or court used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
In three cases prior to Sinderson, the Missouri Supreme Court considered the use of a juvenile's statements to police officers and juvenile
authorities in a criminal proceeding instituted after waiver of jurisdiction
by the juvenile court. 19 In the first case, State v. Arbeiter,20 hereinafter
referred to as Arbeiter I, the court held that statements elicited from a
juvenile by police officers, in disregard of the provision of the Juvenile
Code which requires a police officer who arrests a juvenile to take him
immediately before the juvenile court or juvenile officer, 21 were inadmissible in a criminal prosecution subsequent to waiver of jurisdiction by the
juvenile court. On this basis, the court reversed Arbeiter's conviction for
first degree murder and remanded the case for a new trial. 22 In order to
obtain admissions which Arbeiter had made while in custody of juvenile
authorities for use in the second trial, the circuit attorney filed a motion.
for a subpoena duces tecum to inspect the records of the juvenile court
pertaining to Arbeiter's detention. 23 After issuing a preliminary writ of
prohibition to quash the subpoena, the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex
rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan,2 4 hereinafter referred to as Arbeiter II, quashed the
writ, holding that the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction and certification of Arbeiter for trial under the general criminal law gave rise to a power
in the circuit court to order the inspection of his records by persons having
a legitimate interest therein, including the circuit attorney and the defendant's counsel.2 5 Arbeiter was again tried and convicted. He appealed his
conviction, and in State v. Arbeiter,26 hereinafter referred to as Arbeiter III,
the Missouri Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the statements
made by Arbeiter to the juvenile oficer, which were presented to and considered by the juvenile court prior to waiver of jurisdiction were made inadmissible in a criminal prosecution by section 211.271 (3) RSMo 1959.2T
Protection of the child offender from abuse of the parens patriae position
of the juvenile court was apparently the reason for the holding. Pointing
out why Arbeiter's statements were not admissible, the court stated:
19. All three of these cases concerned the statements of a fifteen year old
boy named Arbeiter: State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1970); State ex rel.
Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. En Banc 1968); State v. Arbeiter, 408
S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
20. 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
21. See § 211.061 (1), RSMo 1969, quoted note 6 supra.
22. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966). The Arizona Supreme
Court reached the same result under a similar statute in State v. Shaw, 93 Ariz. 40,
378 P.2d 487 (1968).
23. This motion was filed pursuant to Mo. R. Clum. P. 25.19.
24. 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
25. State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. En Banc
1968). See McKinnis, Juvenile Social Records and Criminal Discovery, 35 Mo. L.
REv. 118 (1970), in which the author is critical of the decision on the grounds that
allowing disclosure of juvenile files negates the purpose of the juvenile courts by
destroying the confidentiality of the proceedings, thus indicating a shift away from
the type of thinking upon which the theory of parens patriae is based.
26. 449 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1970).
27. Id. at 632-33; see § 211.271 (3), RSMo 1959, quoted note 7 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5
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This would permit the juvenile officer to procure the admission
of the juvenile in the relaxed, nonadversary atmosphere of the
juvenile interrogation and make
the statement admissible in sub23
sequent criminal proceedings.
However, Arbieter III did not adopt a rule calling for strict prohibition of
all juvenile statements in subsequent criminal proceedings. This question
29
was left open to future decision.
In Sinderson the court clarified the decision in Arbeiter Iso and answered the question left open by Arbeiter 111.31 Concluding that there had
been no violation of section 211.061 (1),82 the court decided that Arbeiter I did not prohibit the admission into evidence of the statements of a
juvenile to police oficers when the juvenile had not been taken into custody
and when the interrogation was arranged by the juvenile officer and conducted in his presence.33 The Court held that Sinderson's statements were
not rendered inadmissible by either section 211.271 (3) of the Juvenile
Code as it existed at the time of his trial, or by the decision in Arbeiter III.34
The court pointed out that the fact situation in Sinderson was quite different from that in Arbeiter III. In the Sinderson case the juvenile was
given a warning meeting constitutional standards prior to questioning and
the interrogation was conducted in an adversary atmosphere s 5 After reviewing the facts surrounding Sinderson's statement on March 6, the court
stated:
The evidence shows that the setting in which defendant gave his
statement was not a relaxed, nonadversary parens patriae situation, as in Arbeiter III. Rather he was warned as to the consequences of making a statement. He was in the police station and a
police captain was participating actively. Under this set of
facts, we hold that the statement was not made inadmissible by
§ 211.271 (3) .... 86
In Sinderson, the court also rejected appellant's contention that the
admission of his statement was fundamentally unfair, thereby refusing to
adopt the position supported by Harling v. United States.37 Harling is
cited as the leading case for the proposition that all admissions of a juvenile made to juvenile court authorities before the juvenile court waives

28. State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Mo. 1970).
29. Id. at 631.
30. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
31. State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1970).
32. See § 211.061 (1), RSMo 1969, quoted note 6 supra.
33. State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 491-92 (Mo. 1970).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 492; State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627, 633-34 (Mo. 1970); see also
Judge Finch's concurring opinion in State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d
371, 379 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
36. State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 492-93 (Mo. 1970). The court was referring to § 211.271 (3), RSMo 1959 as it existed at the time of Sinderson's trial.
See statutes quoted note 7 supra.
37. 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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jurisdiction are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding.38 In.
stead the court stated:
Presuming that federal constitutional Fifth & Sixth Amendment
rights are granted, we believe that an absolute prohibition is not
required so long as it is made dear to the juvenile that criminal
responsibility can result and that the questioning authorities are
not operating as his friends but as his adversaries. 39
In June, 1969, the Missouri General Assembly amended section
211.271 (3) of the Juvenile Code, to become effective on October 13, 1969.
The express language of the statute prohibits the use in a criminal prosecution of any statement made to the juvenile officer or juvenile court personnel prior to waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court.40 Although
the amended version of the statute was mentioned both in Arbeiter 11141
and in Sinderson.42 It was said not to govern in either case because both cases
arose before its passage. 43 However, the court in Arbeiter III indicated
that the new provision would act as a complete bar to the use in a criminal
proceeding of a juvenile's statement made to juvenile authorities prior to
waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. 44 Speaking of the use of a
juvenile's statements in the situation later raised by Sinderson, the court in
Arbeiter III stated that "the legislature . . . has put the question here
raised at rest by amending paragraph 3 of § 211.271 .... 45 It would seem

that a case similar to Sinderson arising after October 13, 1969, would be
decided differently, and that Missouri by statute has joined the ranks of
the jurisdictions which follow the doctrine of absolute prohibition as
38. Id. at 164; accord, State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967);
Francois v. State, 188 So. 2d 7 (Fla. App. 1966). The Harling decision was based
on the proposition that the parens patriae relation must be protected. Missouri and
other jurisdictions have distinguished the situaion where the questioning authorities were acting as adversaries to the juvenile; e.g. State v. Sinderson, 455
S.W.2d 486. (Mo. 1970); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr.
586 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968); People v. Magee, 217 Cal. App. 2d
443, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 925 (1964); People v. Hester,
39 Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968), petition for cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 660
(1970); People v. Connolly, 33 Ill. 2d 128, 210 N.E.2d 523 (1965); State v. Lewis,
468 P.2d 899 (Ore. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311
(1966).
39. State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 493 (Mo. 1970); accord, State v.
Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966).
40. Compare § 211.271 (3), RSMo 1969 with § 211.271 (3), RSMo 1959; see
statutes quoted note 7 supra.
41. State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627, 634 (Mo. 1970).
42. State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 493 (Mo. 1970).
43. Since State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. 1970), had excluded the
statement on the basis of the prior version of § 211.271 (3), the court did not, rule
on the retroactive application of the amended version of the statute. However, in
State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970), the court rejected the contention
that the amended version of § 211.271 (3) merely clarified the previously existing
provision, and therefore refused to apply the statute retroactively to bar Sinder-

son's statements.

44. Sate v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627, 634 (Mo. 1970).
45. Id.
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laid down by Harling v. United States.46 Although in interpreting the
amended version of section 211.271 (3) the Missouri courts could avoid
a complete prohibition by ruling that the legislative purpose was to protect the parens patriae relationship and that the admission into evidence
of otherwise admissible statements given by a juvenile in an adversary
atmosphere would not be an undermining or abuse of the parens patriae
philosophy, it is unlikely that this will result. 47 Considering the dicta in
Arbeiter IIs and the clear prohibitive language of the statute, it is
more likely that the Missouri courts will follow the express language and
render inadmissible in a criminal prosecution all statements made by a
juvenile to juvenile authorities prior to waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. This interpretation, together with the decision in Arbeiter I
barring the admission of statements elicited by the police, leaves the juvenile offender in the position that no statement elicited from him prior to
waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court could be used as evidence against
him or "for any purpose whatsoever in any proceeding, civil or criminal.... "40 other than proceedings under the Juvenile Code.
GEORGE M. BOCK

SETTLEMENT WITH ONE JOINT TORT-FEASOR NOT A BAR
TO RECOVERY OF STATUTORY MAXIMUM IN
MISSOURI WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
Crowder v. Gordons Transports,Inc.1
Walter W. Crowder, domiciled in Arkansas, died in Missouri on July
27, 1965 as a result of injuries received the same day in a collision between
a tractor-trailer owner by the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. ("Frisco"), which he was driving in the course of his employment, and a tractortrailer transport operated by James J. Gray. Gray was driving the transport
in the course of his employment by Gordons Transports, Inc. ("Gordons"), a Tennessee corporation engaged in interstate commerce in Arkansas, Missouri, and other states. The accident occurred in Missouri less than
one mile north of the Arkansas border. Crowder was survived by his widow,
46. 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961); accord, State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495,
433 P.2d 625 (1967).
47. If the purpose of § 211.271 (3), as amended, is to protect the parens patriate
relationship from abuse, it would not serve this purpose to apply the statute to
bar admission of evidence procured in a situation where the parens patriae relationship was non-existent. Cf. State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Mo. 1970).
48. State v. Arbeiter, 449 S.W.2d 627, 634 (Mo. 1970).
49. § 211.271 (3), RSMo 1969, quoted note 7 supra. However, this would not
render inadmissible in a criminal proceeding a juvenile's spontaneous statement to
police prior to being taken before juvenile authorities; see Harling v. United
States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961); State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 492
(Mo. 1970); State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Mo. 1966).
1. 419 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1969).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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Ruth, and two minor sons on whose behalf this wrongful death action was
brought.
On June 30, 1966, Ruth Crowder, in consideration of the payment
of $30,000 made to her individually and as administratrix, gave Frisco,2
a common carrier subject to F.E.L.A., her written covenant not to sue.
Shortly thereafter, the present action was commenced against Gordons in
the Federal District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. After considerable preliminary hassling,3 the plaintiffs sought relief under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act 4 which contained a limitation of $25,000 on
the damages that could be awarded. 5 The court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 6 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that a settlement with one of two alleged joint
tort-feasors does not bar a wrongful death action against the other even
when the amount paid by the settling party exceeds the statutory maximum
7
for wrongful death.
It was long held at common law that the wrongful death of an individual did not give rise to a cause of action.8 Such an action was first
created in England by Lord Campbell's Act of 1846. 9 Missouri first enacted
a wrongful death statute in 1855 with a $5,000 limit on recoverable danages; 10 however, the statute involved in this case, which was adopted in
1955,11 limited damages to $25,000.12 On the other hand, the Federal Em2. The distinction between a covenant not to sue and a release is somewhat
confused in Missouri cases, and would probably make no practical difference in
this discussion. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 330 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.
1960); Judd v. Walker, 158 Mo. App. 156, 138 S.W. 655 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911).
3. A motion to dismiss with leave to amend pleadings was granted; plaintiffs
amended seeking relief under the Missouri wrongful death statute rather than the
Arkansas statute. A motion to dismiss on grounds that the Missouri statute of
limitations had run was granted. 264 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1967). On appeal
the amendment was held to relate back and was, therefore, within the period of
limitation. 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
4. §§ 537.080-.090, RSMo 1959 [now §§ 537.080-.090, RSMo 1969J.
5. § 537.090, RSMo 1959 read as follows:

Amount of damages recoverable-In every action brought under section
537.080, the jury may give to the surviving party or parties who may be entitled to sue such damages, not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, as
the jury may deem fair and just for the death and loss occasioned, with
reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death and having regard for the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or default resulting in such death.
This section was amended in 1967 to increase the limit to $50,000. § 537.090, RSMo
1969.
6. 289 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
7. 419 F.2d at 485.
8. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808); Higgins v. Butcher, 80
Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607); accepted in U.S., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New
York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475

(1848).
9. Fatal Accidents Act, 9 9- 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
10. C. 51, at 647, RSMo 1855. For a history of early wrongful death acts
in Missouri, see Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d
920 (En Banc 1933).

11. §§ 537.080-.100, RSMo 1959 (amended subsequent to the date this cause of

action arose, §§ 537.080-.100, RSMo 1969).
12. § 537.090, RSMo 1959, quoted note 5 supra.
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ployers Liability Act,' 3 to which Frisco was subject, includes an action for
wrongful death of covered employees but contains no limit on damages the
jury may award.
The question to be answered in Crowder was what effect the covenant
not to sue entered into with Frisco had on plaintiffs cause of action against
Gordons. The original common law rule in Missouri was that a release of
one tort-feasor operated as a release of all joint tort-feasors.' 4 This rule
was changed in 1915 by a statute' 5 which has been consistently applied to
allow a claimant to "settle with one of two or more joint tort-feasors and release that particular joint tort-feasor from further liability, and still hold
and sue the others for the balance of damages."' 6 Notwithstanding this statutory change, the claimant is entitled to only one satisfaction of his claim.
Thus, once he has received full compensation for his injuries, he may not
recover from another wrongdoerlT Under this reasoning, the covenant not
to sue settlement with Frisco would bar plaintiffs from proceeding against
Gordons only if it was found that the settlement was a "full satisfaction"
for their injuries.
The wording of the statute permitting release of a joint tort-feasor
is that the claimant may recover "the balance of said claim or cause of
action."' 8 This wording would seem to require a $30,000 settlement to be
interpreted as a "full satisfaction" of the "claim or cause of action," thus
barring a subsequent recovery from a joint tort-feasor. However, the court
held that section 587.09019 did not purport to say damages could not exceed $25,000, but merely fixed an arbitrary and artificial maximum on the
amount the jury can award. 20 The court relied on Missouri cases in con-

13. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1964).

14. Dulaney v. Buffum, 173 Mo. 1, 73 S.W. 125 (1903); Hubbard v. St. Louis
9. M. R.R., 173 Mo. 244, 72 S.W. 1073 (1903).
15. § 537.060, RSMo 1969 (in part):
It shall be lawful for all persons having a claim or cause of action
against two or more joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers to compound, settle
with, and discharge any and every one or more of said joint tort-feasors or
wrongdoers for such sum as such person or persons may see fit, and to
release him or them from all further liability to such person or persons
for such tort or wrong, without impairing the right of such person or
persons to demand and collect the balance of said claim or cause of action
from the other joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers against whom such person
or persons has such claim or cause of action, and not so released.
16. Booker v. Kansas City Gas Co., 231 Mo. App. 214, 219, 96 S.W.2d 919,
92 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936), quoted with approval, New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
O'Brien, 330 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Mo. 1960); accord, Vinson v. East Tex. Motor
Freight Lines, 280 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. 1955); Berry v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.,
343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825 (1938); Roberts v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo. App.
1162, 163 S.W.2d 369 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942); Farrell v. Kingshighway Bridge Co.,
117 S.W.2d 693 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938); Burton v. Joyce, 22 S.W.2d 890 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1930); Judd v. Walker, 158 Mo. App. 156, 138 S.W. 655 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911).
17. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 330 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1960); Meyers
v. Kennedy, 306 Mo. 268, 267 S.W. 810 (En Banc 1924); McEwen v. Kansas City
Pub. Serv. Co., 225 Mo. App. 194, 19 S.W.2d 557 (K.C. Ct. App. 1929); Judd v.
Walker, 158 Mo. App. 156, 138 S.W. 655 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911).
18. § 537.060, RSMo 1969 (emphasis added), quoted note 15 supra.
19. § 537.090, RSMo 1959, quoted note 5 supra.
20. 419 F.2d at 483.
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duding that "the statutory limit is not meant to be the maximum value of
human life ... ."21 This statement, put in the context in which it was used
by the Missouri court, is an answer to the argument that the jury cannot
award damages at or near the maximum when plaintiff's loss was less than
it might have been under other circumstances. The complete statement,
originating in the leading case of Marlow v. Hafziger Baking Co., is that
the statutory limit... is not meant to be the maximum value of human life, which can only be recovered upon showing the greatest
and earning power under the
imaginable loss of life expectancy
22
most aggravating circumstances.
The court in Crowder then held that the policy of the Federal Employers Liability Act 23 required that settlements thereunder should not operate
to prevent plaintiffs from recovering, in a subsequent suit against a joint
tort-feasor, the balance of any damages which they can prove up to the limit
under the Missouri wrongful death provisions.2 4 The United States Supreme
Court commented in Burnett v. New York Central Railroad that F.E.L.A.
"has a uniform operation, and neither is nor can be deflected therefrom by
local statutes." 2 5 This uniform operation would dearly be defeated by applying the varying limitations on recovery in wrongful death statutes to
plaintiffs suing under F.E.L.A.2 6 Thus, if plaintiffs settled with Gordons
first and then sought to sue Frisco under F.E.L.A., the fact that they had
already received the limit under the Missouri Act would not bar recovery
for any further damages which they could prove.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed logic to prevail by holding that the order in which plaintiffs proceeded against defendants should
make no difference in the amount which they were entitled to recover, and
that the limitation in the Missouri act applied only to the recovery from
Gordons and not to the total amount which plaintiffs could receive for
their losses arising out of the accident. F.E.L.A. liability on the part of one
defendant thus enables a partial avoidance of the wrongful death limitation
of the Missouri statute.
Although the federal court of appeals applied "Missouri law," one
may speculate as to whether the Missouri Supreme Court would, in fact,
decide this question the same way. In Myers v. Kennedy, 27 which was not
referred to in Crowder, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed a covenant not
21. Id.
22. Marlow v. Hafziger Baking Co., 333 Mo. 790, 801, 63 S.W.2d 115, 121
(1933); accord, Waller v. Oliver, 296 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1956); Huffman v. Mercer,
295 S.W.2d 27, 35 (Mo. 1956); Combs v. Combs, 284 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Mo. 1955);
Steeger v. Meehan, 63 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo. 1933).
23. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1964).
24. 419 F.2d at 485.

25. 380 U.S. 424, 433 (1965); accord, Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S.

485, 491 (1916); Graham v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 1133, 212 S.W.2d 770 (En Banc

1948); Mooney v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 352 Mo. 245, 76 S.W.2d 605 (1944).
26. In fact, over two-thirds of the jurisdictions have no maximum limit at all
OF TORTs § 121, at 932

on recovery under wrongful death acts. W. PROSSER, LAw
(3d ed. 1964).
27. 306 Mo. 268, 267 S.W. 810 (En Banc 1924).
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to sue settlement for $6,000 with a streetcar company, a concurrent tortfeasor liable for the wrongful death under a penalty statute, 28 to be deducted
from the $10,000 maximum allowed by the actual and punitive damages
statute then in force.2 9 The resulting maximum, $4,000, was recovered
from the driver of a private car also involved in the accident.
The fact situation in Crowder presents several other issues not considered by the court. First, there is a possibility that Ruth Crowder may
have appropriated the entire cause of action. In Spencer v. Bradley,30 the
Missouri Supreme Court held that a partial release of certain parties by the
husband of the deceased, even though accompanied by an express reservation, appropriated the entire cause of action to himself and barred the children from suing other parties. Since Ruth Crowder had settled with Frisco
under F.E.L.A. both in her individual capacity as well as in her capacity as
administratrix, and was now seeking to sue on behalf of the children under
the wrongful death statute, it might well have been argued that Spencer
precluded any further suit. Spencer, however, has not been referred to in
subsequent Missouri cases nor has any other state taken a similar position in
applying changes in the common law doctrine that a release of one joint
tort-feasor is a release of all.
A more interesting possibility arises out of the multi-state relationships
involved. The Arkansas wrongful death statute31 contains no arbitrary
maximum limit on the damages award, providing merely that the jury
"may fix such damages as will be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries."3 2 Since the case was filed in federal court in Arkansas,
and the general rule is that the federal courts in diversity cases apply the
law of the state in which they sit (including the conflict of laws rules),8 3
the question of which wrongful death provisions govern depends on the
Arkansas conflict of laws requirements. The federal district court applied
the rule of lex loci delicti, in accordance with numerous Arkansas cases, 3 1
which made the law of Missouri applicable.
In Missouri, however, following Kennedy v. Dixon 35 in which the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the "most significant contacts" rule in tort
cases, the judge might well have found Arkansas to have the most significant
contacts with the case, and therefore would have applied the Arkansas
wrongful death act with no limitations on damages.
Thus, in order for the plaintiffs in Crowder to take advantage of the
Missouri conflicts rule it would be necessary to convince the district court
that Arkansas would apply the whole law of the place of the tort, including
28. § 4217, RSMo 1919.
29. § 4218, RSMo 1919.
30. 351 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1961).
31. ARK.STAT.
32. ARK. STAT.

ANN.
ANN.

§§ 27-906 to -910 (Replacement vol. 3A, 1962).
§ 27-909 (Replacement vol. 3A, 1962).

33. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
34. Trotter v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp., 226 Ark. 722, 294 S.W.2d
498 (1956); Wheeler v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 207 Ark. 601, 182 S.W.2d
214 (1944); Tipler v. Crafton, 202 Ark. 351, 150 S.W.2d 625 (1941); American Ry.
Express Co. v. Davis, 152 Ark. 258, 238 S.W. 50 (1922).
35. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
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the conflicts of laws rules, which in this case would refer back to the substantive law of Arkansas. This doctrine, known as renvoi, has been rejected
by most jurisdictions considering the question; 6 however, the only Arkansas case in point avoided decision on whether to follow the renvoi doctrine
after determining that the result would be the same.37
Still another approach would be the argument that the Arkansas Supreme Court would, if presented with the proper fact situation, adopt the
"most significant contacts" or "center of gravity" rule for tort cases. This
is the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,38 the Uniform
Commercial Code, 39 and a growing number of jurisdictions for tort cases.40
Furthermore, since the rule of lex loci delicti is not constitutionally required
it is within the power of a state to apply its law to any issue in which it has
41
a substantial interest.
Support for the "significant contacts" approach can be found in previous Arkansas cases. 42 Gentry v. Jett43 allowed recovery under the Arkansas
Workman's Compensation statute, by an Arkansas resident with an Arkansas employer, for an injury occuring in Oklahoma. McGinty v. Ballentine
Produce, Inc.4 4 applied the law of the place of the tort, but commented
favorably on the "most significant contacts" rule; the court pointed out that
the only contact Arkansas had was location of the defendant's place of business, whereas the residence of the decedent, place of mishap, and appointment of the administratrix were all in Missouri.45
36. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HA~v. L. Rrv. 1165, 1170 (1938).

37. Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., 236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d 158 (1963).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 379 (1964).
39. UNIFORM ConmARCLA.L CODE § 1-105; See § 400.1-105, RSMo 1969, and
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-105 (Supp. I vol. 7C, 1961).

40. Emmert v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1969); Merchants National Bank &Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.I). 1967) (stating
South Dakota, if presented with the proper case, would follow the most significant
relationship rule); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Wartell
v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d
831 (Iowa 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Abendschein v.
Farrell, 11 Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968) (applying the rule to the
specific fact situation, but saying it was without power to overrule lex loci);
Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Craig v. Columbus
Compress & Warehouse Co., 210 So. 2d 645, 649 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v. Dixon,
439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353, 222 A.2d
205, 208 (1966); Maffatone v. Woodson, 99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (1968);
Babcock v. Jackson, 19 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Casey v. Manson
Constr. &Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I.
1968); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
41. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1961); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
42. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has upheld lex loci in tort cases
whenever the question has been presented. See Bell Transp. Co. v. Morehead,
437 S.W.2d. 234 (Ark. 1969); Trotter v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp., 226 Ark.
722, 294 S.W.2d 498 (1956); Wheeler v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 207 Ark.
601, 182 S.W.2d 214 (1944).
43. 235 Ark. 20, 356 S.W.2d 736 (1962).
44. 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966). This case involves statutory construction rather than a conflict of law question but the reasoning allows a direct
analogy to conflicts cases.
45. Id. at 535, 408 S.W.2d at 893.
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Thus, plaintiffs might also have been successful if they had sued under
the Arkansas wrongful death act and convinced the federal judge that Arkansas would adopt either the "most significant contacts" approach or the
dubious renvoi doctrine. In addition, they could have sued in Missouri
under the doctrine of Kennedy v. Dixon.46
Success on the conflicts question could have avoided the whole problem for plaintiffs, 47 but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a
commendable result in the case as presented. The court followed logic
in cutting through the tangle of verbal statements of law and holding that
the order in which plaintiffs proceeded against the defendants was irrelevant. Settlement with the F.E.L.A. defendant should not bar the plaintiffs
from recovering against a joint tort-feasor in a Missouri wrongful death
action if they can prove additional damages. This decision will enable
survivors to be compensated for a greater share of their actual losses, at
least in one special case, for a wrongful death resulting in liability under
Missouri law.
DAVID C. CHRISTIAN

LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
Barnett v. Schumacher1
In this action for slander, plaintiff alleged that he had presented a
note executed by the decedent to the defendant-executor and that, upon
examination of the note in the presence of a third party, the defendant-executor claimed it had been forged by the plaintiff. The defendant-executor
filed a motion to dismiss upon the grounds, among others, that he was
charged only in his representative capacity and not as an individual, and that
the petition did not constitute a cause of action against the defendant-executor either as an individual or in his capacity as executor. The circuit court
sustained the motion and dismissed the petition 2 On appeal the Missouri
Supreme Court held that plaintiff had a cause of action against the executor in his individual capacity but not against the estate, stating:
[T]he office of a personal representative is a naked trust; [the
trustee] is restricted in the performance of acts connected with or
incident to the execution of his trust and cannot create a new obligation so as to bind the estate.3
46. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
47. The prior settlement with Frisco would not operate as a release of the
joint tort-feasor under Arkansas law. It makes no difference whether the agreement was interpreted as a covenant not to sue (Douglas v. Thompson, 206 Ark.
92, 176 S.W.2d 717 (1944); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Liebe, 201 Ark. 292,
144 S.W.2d 29 (1940); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Burks, 196 Ark. 1104, 121 S.W.2d 65
(1936)) or whether it is considered to be a release (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1004
(1947)). Thus, under Arkansas law, there would be no obstacle to plaintiffs' recovering all damages suffered.
1. 453 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. 1970).
2. Id. at 936.
3. Id. at 937.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

13

1971]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 5
RECENT CASES

In other words, "an estate cannot be held liable for a tort committed by an
executor, administrator or trustee, even though the tort is committed in
the course of the administration of the estate." 4 This general rule has been
applied in a number of situations including those involving negligence,5
7
trespass, 6 and fraudulent misrepresentation by the fiduciary.
Certain exceptions to this general rule, however, have been created
under which the estate may be exposed to liability.8 These exceptions
fall into two categories: indirect and direct liability. The first category, indirect liability, applied to two situations. The first situation occurs when
the plantiff recovers against the fiduciary in his personal capacity and the
personal representative or trustee is entitled to indemnify himself from the
estate. 9 The fiduciary has this right of indemnification only if he is not
personally at fault.10 For example, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a trustee or personal representative may be held liable for the torts
of his employees, but would have a right of indemnification since he was
not personally at fault." The second situation arises when a tort creditor,
unable to satisfy his judgment against the fiduciary personally, is subrogated to the fiduciary's right of exoneration from the estate. 12 Both of these

4. Id. at 936.
5. T. L. Horn Trunk Co. v. Delano, 162 Mo. App. 402, 142 S.W. 770 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1912). The court held that the estate was not liable for the negligence of
the administratrix, who failed to keep a water tank in repair in a building belonging to the estate.
6. Brown v. Floyd, 163 Ala. 317, 50 So. 995 (1909). The estate was held
not liable for the unwarranted and unlawful trespass of the executor.
7. Richardson v. Palmer, 24 Mo. App. 480 (K.C. Ct. App. 1887). The estate
was held not liable for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the administrator in
the sale of a bull at an administrator's sale.
8. Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928);

Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. R v. 627, 653 (1962); 39 MicH.

L. R.v. 673, 674 (1941).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 247 (1959) provides: "The rules stated
in §§ 244 and 245 are applicable to liabilities in tort incurred by the trustee in
the course of the administration of the trust."
§ 244 provides: "The trustee is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate
for expenses properly incurred by him in the administration of the trust."
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, Explanatory Notes § 247, comment a

at 624 (1959) provides: "If the liability was incurred in the proper administration

of the trust and the trustee was not personally at fault in incurring the liability, he

is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate."
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, Explanatory Notes § 247, comment b
at 624 (1959) provides:
Where a tort to a third person results from the negligence of an agent or
servant properly employed by the trustee in the administration of the
trust, and the trustee is not personally at fault, although the trustee is
liable to the third person, he is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 268 (1959). See also Kellogg v.
Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div. 214, 112 N.Y.S. 566 (1908). The general rule seems to be that a claimant having a right of subrogation can have no
greater rights than one to whose rights he is subrogated. Plate Glass Underwriters'
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ridgewood Realty Co., 219 Mo. App. 186, 269 S.W. 659 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1925). So it would seem that if a fiduciary is liable to the estate from another
transaction, this would limit the claimant's rights in a subrogation action against
the estate.
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situations involve circuitry;' 8 the initial action in each case is against the
personal representative or trustee in his individual capacity, not directly
against the estate. This produces a possibility of duplicative litigation when
one suit would suffice. 14 Furthermore, this problem is compounded by the
fact that the majority view seems to be that the plaintiff's recovery in the
initial action is not limited in amount to the value of the assets of the
estate. 15 Obviously there is a possibility that the trustee or executor will
not be fully indemnified.
The second category, direct liability, pertains to actions where the
estate is reached directly by a suit against the personal representative or
trustee in his official capacity.' 0 Direct liability of the estate has been allowed in the following situations: (1) where property passes into the estate
at the time of decedent's death and the executor wrongfully detains the
property believing it to belong to the estate;' 7 (2) where the will or trust
expressly subjects the estate to liability for the fiduciary's torts;' 8 (3) where
a tort benefits the estate or trust and the fiduciary is not at fault;' 9 (4)
where a tort is committed in the course of proper trust administration, and
the fiduciary is insolvent and not personally at fault;2 0 and (5) where a tort
the trustee is acting under the control or supervision of
is committed while
2
the beneficiaries. '
In considering the first of these situations, the Missouri Supreme Court
in State ex rel. Gnekow v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 2 2 seemed
13. Kirchner v. Miller, 280 N.Y. 23, 19 N.E.2d 665 (1939); see also Wright
v. Caney River R.R., 151 N.C. 510, 66 S.E. 588 (1909); Ewing v. William L. Foley,
Inc., 115 Tex. 222, 280 S.W. 499 (1926).
14. See generally Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1928); Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div. 214, 112 N.Y.S.
566 (1908).
15. Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill. 331, 138 N.E. 604 (1923); REsTATENtENT (SEcoND)
or TRUSTS § 264 (1959). For an exception to this rule see McLaughlin v. Minnesota
Loan &Trust Co., 192 Minn. 203, 255 N.W. 839 (1934), where the court held that
a trustee's individual liability to pay rent, taxes, and assessments running with the
trust's property was limited by the assets of the estate.
16. State ex rel. Gnekow v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 349 Mo. 528,
163 S.W.2d 86 (1942); Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1928). See 31 Am. Jun. 2d Executors &rAdministrators §§ 260, 262-64 (1967).
RESrATEM ENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 268 (1959) provides:
If a person to whom the trustee has become personally liable in the course
of the administration of the trust cannot obtain satisfaction of his claim
out of the trustee's individual property, he can by a proceeding in equity
reach trust property and apply it to the satisfaction of his claim to the
extent to which the trustee is entitled to exoneration out of the trust
estate.
17. State ex rel. Gnekow v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 349 Mo. 528,
163 S.W.2d 86 (1942); 31 Am. JuR. 2d Executors & Administrators§ 262 (1967).
18. Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928);
Prinz v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 309 (1905); 39 MictH. L. R-v. 673 (1941).
19. Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N.Y. 394, 138 N.E. 33 (1923); Wright v.
Caney River R.R., 151 N.C. 510, 66 S.E. 588 (1909).
20. Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928);
Carey v. Squire, 63 Ohio App. 476, 27 N.E.2d 175 (1939).
21. Wright v. Caney River R.R., 151 N.C. 510, 66 S.E. 588 (1909); Ross v.
Moses, 175 S.C. 355, 179 S.E. 757 (1935).
22. 349 Mo. 528, 163 S.W.2d 86 (1942).
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to indicate, in dicta, that if the administrator or executor wrongfuly detains property of a third party which the estate has acquired at or after
the decedent's death, the owner can maintain an action directly against

the estate. The court alluded to two prior Missouri cases which stated
that "if the administrator still has the specific property, the owner may
maintain a suit in replevin for it against the administrator in his official

capacity, '

23

and if the administrator has sold it and "receives and uses the

proceeds as part of said estate, a court of equity would afford relief to the
owner by decreeing payment to be made for such property out of the
funds of the estate." 24 Thus, Gnekow seems to allow these two remedies to

reach the estate directly when the fiduciary wrongfully detains property.25
elect to maintain
It should be noted, however, that the claimant may still
26

an action against the fiduciary in his personal capacity.
The second situation exposes the estate or trust to liability when the
will or trust expressly provides for such liability.2 7 This principle was upheld in Birdsong v. Jones28 where the will provided "that all liabilities incurred in the operation and management of said trust estate should be paid
by said trustees from said trust estate."2 9 In this case the court indicated
that there was no question that the trustee was personally liable because
the plaintiff had suffered injury as a result of the negligence of one of the
trustee's employees. The court, however, allowed recovery directly against
the estate in accordance with the will.30 Therefore, this type of provision in
the will can expose an estate to direct liability even when the trustee, executor, or administrator has not acted in good faith and has in fact been
negligent. Birdsong also seems to indicate that in Missouri the doctrine of
respondeat superior can be applied by the courts to hold an administrator,
executor, or trustee individually liable for the torts3 of his servants and
employees in the administration of the trust or estate. '
While there seem to be no Missouri cases directly in point on the last
three situations, the third and fourth were at least recognized in Birdsong
v. Jones.82 Considering the third exception, which exposes the estate to
23. Id. at 89, citing White v. McFarland, 148 Mo. App. 338, 128 S.W. 23 (St. L
Ct. App. 1910).
24. Silsby v. Wickersham, 171 Mo. App. 128, 132, 155 S.W. 1094, 1095 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1913). It is important to note that in the Missouri Probate Code there is a
statutory alternative to replevin. The statutes provide a remedy to regain wrongfully
withheld property by a proceeding in probate court. §§ 473.340-.357, RSMo 1969.
Williamson's Estate v. Williamson, 380 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1964); In re Myers Estate,
376 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. En Banc 1964); Longacre v. Knowles, 333 S.W.2d 67 (Mo.
1960); Masterson v. Plummer, 343 S.W.2d 352 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
25. State ex rel. Gnekow v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 349 Mo. 528,
163 S.W.2d 86 (1942).
26. 31 Am. JUR. 2d Executors & Administrators § 262 (1967).
27. See cases cited note 18 supra.
28. 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
29. Id. at 770, 8 S.W.2d at 99.
30. Id. at 771, 8 S.W.2d at 100.
31. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TRusrs § 264 (1959) provides:
The trustee is subject to personal liability to third persons for torts committed in the course of the administration of the trust to the same extent
that he would be liable if he held the property free of trust.
32. 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
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direct liability where a tort benefits the estate or trust and the fiduciary is
not at fault, the court quoted from Wright v. Caney River R.R. 3 3 where
that court said, "[I]f it is shown that an obligation has been assumed by an
executor for the protection of the estate, and has inured to its benefit, its
payment will usually be allowed him in an account with the distributees." 3 4
As previously stated, the fourth exception exposes the estate to direct
liability where a tort is committed in the course of proper trust administration, and the fiduciary is insolvent and not personally at fault.3 5 In support of this exception the court mentioned that "in cases where such allowance [indemnity to the trustee] is proper, in order to prevent circuitry
of action the estate may be held liable directly to the party injured."8 6 As
described in the next paragraph, in jurisdictions which do not recognize
this exception, the claimant must maintain an initial action against the
personal representative and then proceed in equity to reach the estate.3s
Thus, the general rule of the naked trust, promulgated in Barnett, has
at least three potential problems. First, there is the possibility that a
claimant, unable to satisfy his judgment against an insolvent fiduciary, will
also be unable to reach the trust or estate property.38 This would happen
under the present exceptions when the trustee or personal representative is
individually at fault. Second, the trustee or personal representative is liable
for his torts under the present law whether or not the estate can be
reached. 39 This could certainly be a prodigious liability for a trustee or
personal representative conducting a dangerous activity, especially since
the trustee's liability is not limited to the assets of the estate.40 This means
that even if the trustee has a right of indemnification he may be unable to
recover the full amount. Third, there is always a possibility of duplicity in
litigation.4 1 This can result in time and expense to both the claimant (in
an action for subrogation) and the personal representative.
It is interesting, and hopefully a harbinger for Missouri, that section
3-808 of the Uniform Probate Code42 seems to alleviate the problems under
33. 151 N.C. 510, 66 S.E. 588 (1909). This case is directly in point with the
fifth exception where the estate is held directly liable when a tort is committed
while the trustee is acting under the control or supervision of the beneficiaries.
The trustee was charged with operating a railroad for the benefit of creditors. An
employee was injured due to the negligence of the trustee or his employees, but the
court held that the estate was liable since the trustee was an agent of the beneficiaries and under their control.
34. Id. at 512; 66 S.E. at 589.
35. Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928);
Carey v. Squire, 63 Ohio App. 476, 27 N.E.2d 175 (1939).
36. Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 772, 8 S.W.2d 98, 100 (K.C. Ct. App.
1928).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 268 (1959).
38. Brown v. Floyd, 163 Ala. 317, 50 So. 995 (1909); T. L. Horn Trunk Co.
v. Delano, 162 Mo. App. 402, 142 S.W. 770 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912); Richardson
v. Palmer, 24 Mo. App. 480 (K.C. Ct. App. 1887).
39. R STATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 264 (1959).
40. Id.
41. See cases cited note 88 supra.
42. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-808 provides:
(a) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a personal representative is not individually liable on a contract properly entered into in
his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless
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the present rules. Since the Uniform Probate Code would allow suits against
the estate for torts committed by the personal representative "whether
or not the personal representative is individually liable ... ,,43 a claimant
would be in a more advantageous position than under present case law
where the estate can be reached directly only in the five previously enumerated exceptions. 44 The claimant could still maintain an action against the
personal representative when he is individually at fault.45
One of the consequences of the Uniform Probate Code provision would
be to protect the personal representative in situations where he is not
personally at fault.46 For instance, in Missouri the trustee is held vicariously liable for the torts of his employees.47 In this situation the Uniform
Probate Code would allow the claimant a suit directly against the estate
but not against the personal representative, since he was not individually at
fault.48 The personal representative would never have the problem of seeking indemnity from the estate because he could never be liable when he was
not individually at fault,4 9 and, for the same reason, would never be liable
for a judgment in excess of the estate assets when he was not personally at
fault.50
Since the Uniform Probate Code would always allow the claimant an
action directly against the estate, he would never have to exhaust the
fiduciary's assets first before having the right to reach the estate or trust
property. 51 Thus, the probability of multiple suits is diminished.
In summary, the Uniform Probate Code
would relieve him [the trustee] from personal liability .. .for
torts committed in the course of trust administration when he was
not personally at fault. It would permit the claimant to sue the
he fails to reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in
the contract.
(b) A personal representative is individually liable for obligations
arising from ownership or control of the estate or for torts committed in
the course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at fault.
(c) Claims based on contracts entered into by a personal representative in his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership or
control of the estate or on torts committed in the course of estate administration may be asserted against the estate by proceeding against the personal representative in his fiduciary capacity, whether or not the personal
representative is individually liable therefor.
(d) Issues of liability as between the estate and the personal representative individually may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge or indemnification or other appropriate proceeding.
It is important to note that similar provisions are made concerning the individual
liability of conservators and trustees in § 5429 and § 7-306, respectively.
43.

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §

45.

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-808.

3-808.

44. See cases cited notes 12-16 supra.

46. Id. Comment.
47. Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S.W.2d 98 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
See also note 31 supra.
48.

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §

3-808.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Carey v. Squire, 63 Ohio App. 476, 27 N.E.2d 175 (1939); UNIFORM

PRO-

BATE CODE 4 3-808.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5

18

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

trustee... and to collect from the trust estate whether or not the
trustee is personally liable. The net effect of these changes would
be to convert every trust, for purposes of contract and tort liability,
into a corporation, with the trustee in the position of general manager of the corporation. This would be fairer52than the present
rule to both trustees and third party claimants.
C.

W.

CRUMPECKER, JR.

STATE HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS:
WHEN WILL A COURT INTERFERE?
Brown v. Wells1
I. INTRODUCTION

This note deals with the legal status of state high school athletic associations: voluntary organizations of high schools formed mainly to promote and regulate competitive athletics between the member schools.2 The
authority of such associations has been challenged in a number of states,
in both state and federal courts,3 the most recent instance being Brown v.
52. Fratcher, Missouri and the Uniform Probate Code, 26 J. Mo. B. 349,
565 (1970).
1. - Minn. -, 181 N.W.2d 708 (1970).
2. The typical state high school athletic association is a voluntary association of high schools, governed by a Board of Control. The members of the board
are educators, typically superintendents or principals, and are elected by the
schools. In Missouri there are eight members of the board; one from each of eight
regions in the state. Day-to-day affairs are handled by a "Commissioner." No state
money is received. Operating funds are obtained from association-sponsored meets
and tournaments. The chief purpose of such associations is to promote and maintain wholesome amateur athletics among its members. To promote this purpose,
a detailed set of rules is adopted by the member schools to govern nearly every
aspect of interscholastic sports. The starting and ending dates for the season of
various sports are prescribed, as well as the dates when practices may commence
and cease. Umpires and referees are examined and certified by the association.
An extensive list of rules is used to govern the eligibility of student athletes. Such
matters as age, scholastic standards, amateur status and inter-school transfers are
tightly regulated. A member is bound under penalty of fine or suspension to report all violations of rules. The Commissioner takes initial action on violations.
Appeal may be had from his ruling to the Board of Control. The constitution of
the association normally provides that the decision of this board is final.
3. Alabama: Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129, 257 So. 2d 652 (1970); Colorado: Colorado High School Activities Ass'n v. Uncompahgre Broadcasting Co.,
134 Colo. 131, 300 P.2d 968 (1956); Florida: Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 51, 3 So. 2d
729 (1941); Illinois: Robinson v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 45 fI1. App. 2d 277,
195 N.E.2d 38 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); Indiana: State ex rel. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence Circuit Court, 240 Ind. 114, 162
N.E.2d 250 (1959); Louisiana: Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n,
430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970); Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine
High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968); Marino v. Waters, 220 So. 2d 802
(La. App. 1969); Minnesota: Brown v. Wells, -

Minn. -,

181 N.W.2d 708
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Wells.4 There is no reported case dealing with the status of the Missouri
State High School Activities Association (MSHSAA). It is hoped that this
note, by examining the cases arising in other states, will shed some light
on the status of the Missouri association.
II.

THE WELLS CASE

In Wells a high school student, by his father, brought suit against the
Minnesota State High School League asking that the league be enjoined
from enforcing certain restrictions it had placed on hockey activities by
students who wished to participate in league hockey matches. The rules
about which the student was complaining would make any student ineligible who participated on an independent hockey team, participated in
any hockey games, practices or other hockey activities out of season, or attended a hockey training camp which was not sanctioned by the league.
The plaintiff contended that the rules were void because they were arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious, and that the rules deprived him of
his "constitutional rights, privileges and immunities."5
The trial court found in favor of the student and enjoined the league
from enforcing its hockey rules. The court stated that a boy should be allowed to follow his legitimate interests without restraint or limitation, except those imposed by law or those necessary to preserve the welfare of his
fellow students. The court further stated that the interscholastic hockey
matches were an "integral part of the school curriculum," that the rules
were not necessary to school welfare, and that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to participate in hockey competition. 6
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the trial court's decision
and dissolved the injunction. The court refused to follow the trial court
in delving into the wisdom of the rules at issue. The court recognized
that, by the "great weight of authority," a court should not attempt to
control the discretion of school boards either singly or as members of an
association.7 It stated that a court would not interfere with the 'affairs of a
state athletic association unless the association's action is "so willful and
unreasoning, without consideration of the facts and circumstances, and in
such disregard of them as to be arbitrary and capricious."8 The court noted
that educational officials "are apparently of the view that high schools are
not obligated to prepare or train students for a career in professional
(1970); Ohio: State ex rel. Ohio High School Athletic Conmm'n v. Judges of the
Court of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio 239, 181 N.E.2d 261 (1962); Oklahoma: Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963); Morrison
v. Roberts, 183 Okla. 359, 82 P.2d 1023 (1938); Tennessee: Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n v. Cox, 221 Tenn. 164, 425 S.W.2d 597 (1968); Texas: University Interscholastic League v. Midwestern Univ., (152 Tex. 124, 255 S.W.2d 177
(1953); West Virginia: State ex rel. West Virginia Secondary School Activities
Comnm'n v. Oakley, 152 W. Va. 533, 164 S.E.2d 775 (1968).
181 N.W.2d 708 (1970).
Minn. -,
4. 5. Id. at -, 181 N.W.2d at 709.
181 N.W.2d at 710.
6. Id. at -,
181 N.W.2d at 711.
7. Id. at -,
181 N.W.2d at 710-711.
8. Id. at -,
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athletics."'9 Since such a policy was not "dearly wrong,"'1 any rules made
to further that goal would not be questioned unless one protesting could
show that the rules were "not supported by reason or adopted in good
conscience." 1
The Wells case is the most recent in a series of cases concerning state
high school athletic associations.' 2 These cases form a chain of precedent for
the general rule that court will usually not interfere with the internal affairs of such associations. Nearly all of the cases find in favor of the associations. But this uniformity of result can not be read as an indication
that the law is settled in the area. In all but the two earliest cases in the
series, the state appellate courts have either reversed or prohibited a lower
court's ruling against the athletic association,'2 or have prohibited the
lower court from hearing a complaint against an association.' 4 In other
words, state athletic associations have consistently been losers at the trial
level and winners on appeal. One reason for this phenomena is that new
methods of attack are devised by the plaintiffs. Because the athletic assodations have muddled along for many years without any recognized
authority over their actions in either the statutes or the cases, many facets
of their conduct were untested and many more remain untested. Since the
associations affect the lives of so many students of so many proud parents,
it can be predicted that the state athletic associations, including the one in
Missouri, will be embattled and tested by much litigation in the future.
What follows is an attempt to point out which matters have already been
settled and which have not.
The starting point of any discussion must center on the fact that the
athletic associations almost without exception fit under the category "voluntary unincorporated association." Under the headings below a summary is
given of the conditions under which a court will intervene in the affairs of
voluntary unincorporated associations. Following this will be a discussion
of the way courts have treated the state high school athletic associations and
the differences and similarities which exist between the law concerning
these associations and regular voluntary associations.
III. JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE wrH A VOLUNTARY AssoCIATION

As a general rule, courts will not interfere to control the administration of the constitution or by-laws of a voluntary association.' 5 The consti9. Id. at

-,

181 N.W.2d at 711.

-,

181 N.W.2d at 712.

10. Id.
11. Id. at

12. See cases cited note 3 supra.
13. See, e.g., Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129, 237 So. 2d 652 (1970); Robinson
v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 45 Ill. App. 2d 277, 195 N.E.2d 38 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); Marino v. Waters, 220 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 1969);
Brown v. Wells, -

Minn.-,

181 N.W.2d 708 (1970); State ex rel. Ohio High

School Athletic Comm'n v. Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio 239,

181 N.E.2d 261 (1962); Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Cox, 221
Tenn. 164, 425 S.W.2d 597 (1968).

14. See e.g., State ex rel. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence Cir-

cuit Court, 240 Ind. 114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959); State ex rel. West Virginia Sec-

ondary School Activities Comm'n v. Oakley, 152 W. Va. 533, 164 S.E.2d 775 (1968).
15. State ex rel. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence Circuit
Court, 240 Ind. 114, 121, 162 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1959).
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tution and by-laws of an association are considered a contract between the
members. 16 As long as the constitution and by-laws are not illegal, and the
association conducts its affairs in good faith and in conformity with its
rules, a court will not intervene. 17 When a departure from the rules is
suspected, a court will not interfere with an association's internal affairs except upon "the clearest kind of showing" that the constitution and rules
have been violated's and, in most cases, only when the complaining member has a "distinct property right ... directly involved."19 Notwithstanding the presence of these factors a court will still be reluctant to intervene,
because it is recognized that the field of judicial interference with the actions of voluntary associations in controversies between their members "is
and should be a very narrow one."2 0 Where the question of the enforcement of certain association rules turns on a factual determination already
made by designated officials of the association, a court will almost never
overturn the findings of fact, because the association's proceedings "are of
a quasi-judicial character, and are no more subject to collateral attack for
' 21
mere error than are the judgments of a court of law.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

WITH A STATE ATiETIC AssoCIATION

A. Common Law
The cases dealing with state athletic associations basicmfIy follow the
general rules as to voluntary associations, but there are some differences.
The main difference is that a judge is especially hesitant to interfere with
the discretion of educational officials. State legislatures normally delegate
discretion to local boards of education by statute. 22 The courts recognize that
such statutes give these boards broad discretion in matters affecting school
management and government. 23 A court may not interfere with such discretion unless a board exercises its power in an arbitrary, unreasonable,
capricious or unlawful manner. The Utah case of Starkey v. Board of Education24 recognized that the discretionary power of a school board includes
the power to make reasonable rules to regulate extracurricular school activities, including interscholastic athletics. 2 5 The Utah court ruled that
there is a presumption that a school board always acts properly, and that
a board rule governing eligibility of students to participate in competitive
16. Junkins v. Local 6313, CWA, 241 Mo. App. 1029, 1038, 271 S.W.2d 71, 76
(Spr. Ct. App. 1954); Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 483, 136 S.W.2d 374,
387 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940).
17. Cases cited note 16 supra.

18. State ex rel. O'Brien v. Petry, 397 S.W.2d 1, 6 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
19. Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 483, 136 S.W.2d 374, 387 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1940); Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Cox, 221 Tenn. 164, 174,
425 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1968).
20. Junkins v. Local 6313, CWA, 241 Mo. App. 1029, 1037, 271 S.W.2d 71,
76 (Spr. Ct. App. 1954).
21. Id.

22. Burns v. Harris, 358 S.W.2d 257, 259 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
23. Id.; Magenheim v. Board of Educ., 347 S.W.2d 409, 417 (St. L. Mo. App.

1961).

24. 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963).
25. Id. at 230, 381 P.2d at 720.
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athletics, if deemed by the board to serve the objectives of the school, will
not be unlawfully arbitrary if the eligibility standard is uniformly applied.2 6
Does it necessarily follow that a school board has the power to authorize the school or schools in its district to join a state athletic association?
The Supreme Court of Ohio thought so. In the case of State ex rel. Ohio
27
High School Athletic Association v. Judges of Court of Common Pleas,
the court held, on the basis of a statutory grant of authority to the schools
boards which closely resembles that found in Missouri, 28 that a school board
had the authority to authorize schools within their district to join a state
high school athletic association. 29 In fact, the courts have not discriminated
between the discretion of one school board to set rules for athletics and
the discretion of groups of schools (i.e., the high school athletics associations) to set rules for athletics:
Surely the schools themselves should know better than any one
else the rules under which they want to compete with each other
in athletic events. . . .And if the officials of the various high
schools desire to maintain membership in the association, and to
vest final rule enforcement authority in the Board of Control, then
so far as affects the affairs of the association, the courts should not
interfere.8 0
As can be seen, the state high school athletic associations, having both
the discretion of a voluntary association and the discretionary power of
school boards, are dually protected from judicial intervention. The net effect has been to make these associations impregnable to almost every attack
yet devised.
Both protections have been tested. The writer of the dissenting
opinion in the 1938 Oklahoma case of Morrison v. Robertss' argued that
high school athletic associations should not enjoy the same degree of im32
munity from interference as that enjoyed by other voluntary associations
because such associations controlled "a field in which the state as a body
politic is primarily interested."3 3 That idea has never been followed. 34
26. Id.
27. 173 Ohio 239, 181 N.E.2d 261 (1962).
28. Compare Omo Ray. CODE ANN. § 3313.20 (Page 1960):
The board of education shall make such rules and regulations as are necessary for its government and the government of its employees and the pupils
of the schools.
with § 171.011, RSMo 1969:
The school board of each school district in the state may make all needful
rules and regulations for the organization, grading and government in the
school district.
29. 178 Ohio at 246, 181 N.E.2d at 265.
30. Morrison v. Roberts, 183 Okla. 359, 361, 82 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1938). See also
Marino v. Waters, 220 So. 2d 802, 807 (La. App. 1969); Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n v. Cox, 221 Tenn. 164, 175, 425 S.W.2d 597, 601 (1968).
31. 183 Okla. 359, 82 P.2d 1023 (1938).
32. Id. at 364, 82 P.2d at 1028 (dissenting opinion).
33. Id.
34. The courts have continued to cite rules applicable to general voluntary
associations. See, e.g., Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129, 133, 237 So. 2d 652, 655

(1970).
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It has also been argued in several cases that participation in interscholastic sports is an integral part of the educational process, that the right
to an education includes the right to participate, and eligibility to participate cannot be taken away by a high school athletic association. 35 This concept strikes at the educational immunity from court intervention enjoyed
by athletic associations. But this argument has also been rejected. 36 Although a student may have a constitutional right to go to school and have
the right to physical training, it is uniformly held that:
Participation in interscholastic athletics ... is a privilege which
the school, or a voluntary association whose rules a school agrees
to follow,37 may withdraw if the student fails to qualify for the
privilege.
Does this mean high school athletic associations are blessed with
limitless discretion? A look at some of the recent cases might indicate this to
be true. The West Virginia Supreme Court stated that "courts have no
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the decisions of such school activities
commissions or associations."3 8 Both the West Virginia court and the Indiana Supreme Court prohibited lower courts from hearing the complaints
of certain students who thought they had been wronged by their high
school athletic associations.3 9 But it surely cannot be said that, under
every conceivable set of circumstances, a court would refuse to enjoin the
conduct of a high school athletic association. Although no state court injunction against such an association has ever been permitted to stand
on appeal, most courts have qualified their rulings in such a way as to
preserve their power to intervene in the future if it is thought necessary.
The courts have most often qualified their holdings by stating that
they would intervene in a case where a state high school athletic association
acted arbitrarily or where a person's property or contractual rights were
involved. Several cases have defined "arbitrary" in this context. One court
said that it makes no difference that the rules of an association appear
to be arbitrary. 40 The court pointed out that the rule that three strikes
retires a batter is arbitrary, 41 and went on to say that the schools were
entitled to make as many "arbitrary" rules as they wanted, "so long
as the member schools want them."42 What is prohibited is application of
the rules in an arbitrary, inconsistent manner. For example, a Louisiana
case held that eligibility rules would not be considered "arbitrary" if the
standards were based upon "uniformly applied classifications which bear
35. See, e.g., Robinson v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 45 I1. App. 2d 277, 286,
195 N.E.2d 38, 43 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); Marino v. Waters,
220 So. 2d 802, 806 (La. App. 1969).
36. See, e.g., cases cited note 35 supra.
37. Marino v. Waters, 220 So. 2d 802, 806 (La. App. 1969).
38. State ex rel. West Virginia Secondary School Activities Comm'n v. Oakley,
152 W. Va. 533, 538-39, 164 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1968).
39. Id.; State ex rel. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Lawrence Circuit
Court, 240 Ind. 114, 124, 162 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1959).
40. Morrison v. Roberts, 183 Okla. 359, 361, 82 P.2d 1023, 1024-25 (1938).
41. Id.
42. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5

24

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

some reasonable relationship to the objectives." 43 The Minnesota Supreme
Court said that so long as there is "room for two opinions on the matter"
it would not consider an association's action "arbitrary" even though it may
44
believe the actions to be erroneous.
Several decisions have also considered the question of what kind of
"contractual right" or "property right" the courts have in mind as a basis
for intervention. The Florida Supreme Court refused to enjoin the suspension of a high school on the argument that such suspension denied the
school the right to make contracts with other schools for athletic meets. 45
In a case where a student was ruled ineligible to play high school football,
the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to reinstate him or to prevent impairment of his "property right" of possibly receiving a college athletic
scholarship. 46 The court found such a right to be too "speculative and
uncertain" to warrant protection. 47 A nearly identical result was reached
48
by the Supreme Court of Alabama.
B. Constitutional Law
Although a state high school athletic association typically operates
without any state sanction, for constitutional law purposes there is sufficient "state action" involved to allow a federal court to entertain a complaint against such associations under 28 U.S.C. § 134349 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 50 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit based a finding of
"state action" on the Louisiana association's power to control school curricula pertaining to physical education, its power to investigate, discipline
and punish member schools (even to the point of keeping one school from
43. Marino v. Waters, 220 So. 2d 802, 808 (La. App. 1969).
44. Brown v. Wells, -Minn.--, 181 N.W.2d 708, 711 (1970).
45. Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 36, 3 So. 2d 729, 731 (1941).
46. Marino v. Waters, 220 So. 2d 802, 806 (La. App. 1969).
47. Id.
48. Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129, 133, 237 So. 2d 652, 656 (1970).
49. See Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155, 1157
(5th Cir. 1970). 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) gives a district court jurisdiction to hear
such a case, by providing (in part):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
50. See Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269 (10th
Cir. 1963). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) creates a cause of action for certain deprivations
of constitutional rights by providing:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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competing with another), and the association's use of state-owned facilities
for its athletic events: 51
[F] or the state to devote so much time, energy, and other resources
to interscholastic athletics and then to refer coordination of those
activities to a separate body cannot obscure the52real and pervasive
involvement of the state in the total program.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit grounded a finding of
"state action" on the fact that the Oklahoma association was governed by
a Board of Control whose membership was composed of high school
principals. Since these men were public employees who continued to act
in that capacity when serving on the board, enforcement of the association's rules was said to be conduct under color of law for purposes of 28
5
U.S.C. § 1983. 3

However, notwithstanding federal court jurisdiction to hear a case,
no relief can be granted a plaintiff unless he shows that he has been denied
some right derived from the United States Constitution. In the few cases
reported, the federal courts have restricted themselves to a very limited

field. In Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association,54 a stu-

dent argued that his participation in interscholastic athletics was a right
and privilege secured by the due process clause of the United States Constitution 55 The court ruled against this argument. A contrary holding
would have resulted in nearly every ruling of a high school athletic association on student eligibility giving rise to a federal case. Although a student deprived of the privilege of playing football his senior year in high
school may feel he has had his most important right taken from him, he
has not necessarily been deprived of a constitutional right, and a federal
judge will not usually intervene.
In the Mitchell case the plaintiff also argued that a certain eligibility
rule violated the equal protection clause. The rule made a student ineligible his senior year if he elected not to proceed to the next grade in junio!
high. But the rule did not apply to those who did not move upward because
they failed to pass. The court stated that since the classification was neither
inherently suspect (e.g., a classification based on race) nor an encroachment on a fundamental right (e.g., the right to vote), it would not intervene. 56 The court thereby declined to follow the active review approach
used in cases involving suspect classifications and fundamental interests,
and instead adopted the restrained approach which holds that a court will
give much deference to discriminations by a state regulatory organization.5 7
51. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 896
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 228.
53. Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269, 273 (10th
Cir. 1963).
54. 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Id. at 1157.
56. Id. at 1158.
57. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAuv. L.
REv. 1065, 1076-1133 (1969).
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Federal courts, in at least two instances, have given redress against actions by athletic associations on the basis of the equal protection clause. 58
Both cases involved instances where two separate athletic associations existed in a state; one for white high schools and another for black high
schools. The cases arose in Alabama and Louisiana. In the Alabama case,
a three judge panel ruled that there could be only one statewide athletic
association and directed the two associations to submit plans for their integration.5 9 In the Louisiana case, the fifth circuit affirmed a district
court's order that the white association accept into membership any high
school which qualified for membership under the constitution of the white
association, regardless of race, and regardless of the wishes of the majority of
the members of the white association. 00

V. TmRD PARTIES
No case has been found involving a dispute between a state high
school athletic association and a person outside normal educational organizations. But it is predictable that such a case may occur at any time.
The facts of Wells indicate one possibility. In that case, a student was complaining about the Minnesota rule that would make him ineligible to play
interscholastic hockey if he attended a hockey training camp which had not
been approved by the state association. What if the owner of an unapproved
camp had brought the complaint alleging that the rule be enjoined because it was ruining his business? Or what about a complaint by a person
who has an athletic event hot-dog concession contract with a school that
has been suspended from participation in interscholastic athletics? "Property rights" are certainly involved. But a question exists as to whether such
a third party has standing to seek an injunction or to recover for damages
resulting from the internal affairs of a voluntary association.
The law on these questions is far from settled. Since no case exists involving a high school athletic association, one must turn to the cases involving other types of voluntary associations. This immediately leads into an
examination of the cases and statutes pertaining to restraints of trade, a
subject far beyond the scope of this note. No attempt will be made to understand the impact of federal antitrust laws on this point, nor will an attempt
be made to examine the varied and confusing array of antitrust statutes
of the various states. But a brief look at Missouri's antitrust statutes and
a look at several cases involving common law rules will provide some helpful insights.
A. Missouri Antitrust Statutes
There is little question that the Missouri antitrust statutes generally
can be applied against voluntary associations,61 but a serious doubt exists
58. See Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School,
396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968); Lee v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194
(M.D. Ala. 1968).
59. Lee v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 283 F. Supp. 194, 198 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
60. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396
F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1968).
61. See Empire Storage & Ice Co. v. Giboney, 357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W.2d 55
(En Banc 1948), aff d, 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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as to the applicability of the statutes to the normal activities of a state
high school athletic association. In the first place, the statutes apply only
to restraints as to products, commodities or articles. 62 This eliminates any
use of the statutes by training camp operators or the like, because they deal
in services, not articles. But what about the hypothetical concessionaire
who is left holding his hot dogs because of restraints by the association?
The Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled that the Missouri antitrust
statutes do not necessarily give a third party a cause of action against a
voluntary association for injuries to that person's business which result
from the enforcement of the association's by-laws. 63 So long as the purpose
of the association is to protect and promote the legitimate interests of its
members and not to restrain trade, "remote or incidental" injuries to the
businesses of nonmembers are not actionable. 4 In addition to the problem
of remoteness, it can be argued that the Missouri antitrust statutes were
never intended to apply to organizations such as the MSHSAA:
The object of the statute is to promote the public welfare, and
not to outlaw harmless combinations, or those which are beneficial
in their nature.65
B. Common Law Rights of Third Parties
Absent statutory authority to the contrary, it can be said that no third
party can enjoin or recover damages for any action taken by a state high
school athletic association against a member school or pupil of such a school.
This is true even when the third party has property rights involved. Al.
though arguments can be made in opposition to the above position, this
,writer considers it defensible. Support can be found in cases which hold
that a third party has no right to complain in court of indirect injuries
resulting from the disciplining or threatened disciplining of a member of a
voluntary association. 66 The reason behind the rule is that such injuries
are too indirect and remote. Just as the tort-feasor is not liable for every
repercussion of his wrong, the voluntary association should not be liable
for every repercussion resulting from its internal affairs.
A definite protection exists for the association from a charge of common law restraint of trade. There is simply no such cause of action:
No case can be found in which it was ever held that at common
law, a contract or agreement in general restraint of trade was
62. See §§ 416.010 et seq., RSMo 1969. See also State v. Green, 344 Mo. 985,
130 S.W.2d 475 (1939); Harelson v. Tyler, 281 Mo. 383, 219 S.W. 908 (1920); State
ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902 (En Banc 1909), aff'd,

224 U.S. 270 (1912); Star Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S.W.
91 (En Banc 1900); Standard Monument Co. v. Mount Hope Cemetery &g
Mausoleum Co., 369 S.W.2d 876 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
63. Harelson v. Tyler, 281 Mo. 383, 219 S.W. 908 (1920).
64. Id. at 399, 219 S.W. at 913; Stephens v. Mound City Liverymen & Under-

takers' Ass'n, 295 Mo. 596, 246 S.W. 40 (En Banc 1922).
65. Gladish v. Bridgeford, 113 Mo. App. 726, 733, 89 S.W. 77, 78 (K.C. Ct.

App. 1905) (construing § 8966, RSMo 1899, a forerunner of the present statutes).
See generally Limbaugh, Historic Originsof Anti-Trust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. Rxv.

215 (1953).
66. See Radio Station KFH Co. v. Local 297, AFM, 169 Kan. 596, 200 P.2d
199 (1950); Downs v. Bennett, 63 Kan. 653, 66 P. 623 (1901).
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actionable at the instance of
third parties or could constitute the
foundation for such action. 67
VI.

CONCLUSION

It can certainly be said that there are some unsettled legal questions

concerning state high school athletic associations. Much uncertainty exists,
especially in the area of third party rights. What is truly surprising is that
there is almost no legislation setting out the powers and duties of these
associations. In Missouri there is no legislation whatsoever. The reputation

of the Missouri association, like all its counterparts, is extremely high. It is
doubtful that the legislature would refuse to grant some form of statutory
authority if it were requested. Such a request may prevent future problems.
DArE C. DOERHOFF

MISSOURI SHOWS DESIRE TO ADOPT EMERGENCY
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Root v. Gauper'
On July 22, 1967, Lonnie Sutton called the local telephone operator
from his farm near Louisiana, Missouri and stated that his wife had shot
him. He said he was dying, and requested that the operator send him an
ambulance. The operator notified the ambulance driver, who, not knowing
the location of the Sutton farm, called the town marshal. After informing
the ambulance driver of the location of the Sutton farm, the marshal called
the county sheriff, and the two of them proceeded separately to the Sutton
home. The ambulance arrived first at the Sutton farm, and Lonnie was
found unconscious with a bullet wound in his stomach. He was placed
in the ambulance and taken to the hospital. On the way, the ambulance
passed both the marshal's and the sheriff's cars and informed them by
radio that Sutton had been removed from the home and was being taken to
the hospital. He was dead on arrival.
The marshal was next to arrive at the Sutton home, but he did not
enter until the arrival of the sheriff several minutes later. The two officers,
without a search warrant, entered the home where they found no one
present but did find a rifle and several bullets which were later entered
into evidence. They took pictures of the room showing the position of
67. Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Holis, 54 Minn. 223, 23-34, 55 N.W. 1119, 1121 (1893),
cited with approval in Gladish v. Bridgeford, 113 Mo. App. 726, 89 S.W. 77 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1905).
1. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971).
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the rifle found there and turned over the seized materials to the highway
patrol for ballistics examination.
Helen Sutton was arrested the next morning and charged with manslaughter by reason of culpable negligence. At her trial, the defense made
timely motion for the exclusion of the evidence obtained by the search of
the Sutton home by the officers.2 This motion was denied. Upon conviction,
Helen Sutton appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. The court upheld
her conviction, with two dissents, holding the search without a warrant
was proper under an exception to the general rule of search and seizure
known as the emergency doctrine.2
This appeal having exhausted her state remedies, Helen Sutton Root 4
applied for a writ of habeas corpus. 5 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri granted petitioner's writ 6 and adopted
as its opinion the earlier dissenting opinion of Judge Finch in State v.
Sutton,7 holding the search to be prohibited by the sixth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. Upon appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the granting of the writ.8
Generally, the police are required to obtain a warrant before searching a private dwelling,9 but the courts have long realized the existence of
situations in which the warrant requirement is impractical. 19 The doctrine
of emergency situations was first enunciated in dicta by Justice Jackson"
when he said, "[T]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it
may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed
with."' 2 Since the formulation of that now famous sentence, the theory
2. The theory was that if the search was illegal, any evidence found in such
a search could not be admitted. This doctrine of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
was first raised in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This doctrine is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). Missouri has had an exclusionary rule since 1924. See note 31 infra.
3. State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
4. Helen Sutton's last name was changed to Root at the time of the filing
of the habeas corpus writ.
5. Root v. Gauper, -F. Supp.(W.D. Mo. 1970).
6. The basic issue on appeal concerned the constitutionality of the search.
7. 454 S.W.2d 481, 488 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (dissenting opinion).
8. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971).
9. "And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of
the police before they violate the privacy of the home." McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
10. The following are examples of these situations: when delay entails a risk
to life "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the
lives of others," Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967; automobile cases
--when "the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought," Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925);
the right to take blood for alcoholic content tests-Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966); as a search incidental to a lawful arrest-Chimel v. California, 395

U.S. 752 (1969); with consent by owner of the premises-Martinez v. United States,
333 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964), vacated, 380 U.S. 260 (1965).

11. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
12. Id. at 14-15. See Walker v. United States, 225 F. 2d 447, 450 (5th Cir.
1955), which defined the exceptions as "limited to search as an incident to arrest,
search of a movable vehicle, and search which may be justified under rare circumhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5
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has developed that an emergency sometimes allows the police to proceed
without search warrants. 18 The Missouri Supreme Court applied the emergency doctrine in upholding the search in the instant case, but this was rejected by the federal courts as (1) either an incorrect application of law to
the facts present here, or (2) a failure of the state to meet its burden of
persuasion to bring the facts within the law.14
The Missouri Supreme Court based its ruling that there was an emergency present on decisions from other jurisdictions. Maryland, in Davis v.
State,1u allowed entrance into a house without a warrant when a pair of
feet could be seen from an open window sticking out from under a bloodstained sheet.1 6 Delaware adopted the emergency doctrine in Patrick v.
Statel7 when the victim was found on the floor of his home in a bloody
mess. The police were allowed to enter without a warrant in the hope that
the victim's life could be saved.' 8
The Missouri Supreme Court seemed to find its greatest support for
the application of the emergency doctrine to the facts in Sutton in the
Alaskan case of Stevens v. State.'9 Stevens, living on a small island off the
Alaskan coast, killed his "buddy" and was arrested by the local constable.
After ten hours, police flew in from Juneau, Alaska, and proceeded to
search Stevens' home without a warrant. Alaska upheld this as a valid search
because "the duty police officer who responds to an emergency call and discovers a homicide is not necessarily a competent officer to conduct the type
stances to prevent threatened destruction or removal of contraband." The court of
appeals in Root stated:
[T]he emergency or exigency doctrine may be stated as follows: police officers may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and
assistance to a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and
in need of that assistance.
438 F.2d at 364.
13. We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or what his mission, a
government official cannot invade a private home, unless (1) a magistrate
has authorized him to do so or (2) an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty affords neither time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate.
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
14. The state also claimed the search to be legal because (1) the items seized
were in plain sight of the officers and (2) they had Lonnie Sutton's consent to
enter. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments because (1)
"[t]he evidence which was seized in this case was not in the plain view of the
officers from outside the house," and (2) "any consent which Sutton may conceivably have given to enter his home was given, not to the police officers, but to
the commercial ambulance operator." 438 F.2d at 364 (8th Cir. 1971).
15. 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965).
16. It is interesting to note that the "body" below the sheet belonged to the
defendant, who was aroused from his slumbers thereunder by the entrance of the
constabulary.
17. 227 A.2d 486 (Del. 1967).
18. In Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), the defendant lived
with his mother in the house where the murder occurred and thereby had standing to challenge the search. In Patrick, the defendant lived with the victim, thereby
having standing. In Sutton, Helen Sutton Root had standing to challenge the
search because she lived in the house where she shot her husband.
19. 443 P.2d 600 (Alas. 1968).
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of investigation necessary to protect the interests of society." 20 However, as
to what the emergency was that made this case analogous to Sutton, the Sutton opinion does not seem to say. The heavy reliance placed on it by the
Missouri Supreme Court seems to be rather puzzling, as the emergency in
Stevens was caused by the remote location of the island and the inaccessability of a magistrate from whom a warrant could have been obtained.
Thus, the emergency doctrine may be said to be an exception to the
warrant requirement and allows the police to enter a dwelling "to render
emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably believe to
be in distress and in need of that assistance." 2 1 In both Davis and Patrick,
the situation of saving a human life obviously was present. In Sutton, either
no such emergency was present or the state failed to meet its burden of persuasion to establish one.
It is hard to justify the officers' entrance into the Sutton home on the
rationale that they believed an injured or dying man was there. The fact
that the marshal waited outside several minutes until the sheriff arrived
would seem to strongly indicate that in the officers' minds no such emergency was present. The officers had been in touch with the ambulance and
knew that Lonnie Sutton had been removed from the house. It seems to
be a rather fantastic assumption to believe that the ambulance would have
left anyone behind who was also injured. In other words, "[t]here is no
other bit of evidence in the record that would even slightly suggest that
the officers had any reason for believing that there were any other persons
in need of aid." 22 The situation in Sutton simply does not support the
proposition that the officers entered with a reasonable belief that their
mission was the preservation of human life.
Even if the officers may have entered the house to see if the decedent's
unknown assailant was still hiding in the house, the search would have
been illegal. "That an officer merely suspects that a felon is in a house is
a precise example of a situation in which a warrant is required, not of one in
23
which a warrant need not be had."
When the state claims exceptional circumstances dispense with the requirement of obtaining a search warrant, it has the burden of proving such
necessity. 24 The court of appeals noted that in the factual situation before
20. Id. at 602-03.
21. 438 F.2d at 364.
22. Id. at 365.
23. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
We think that under the authorities officers without a warrant cannot
enter, even without actually breaking, a private dwelling to search for a
suspected felon, no permission being given and no circumstances of necessitous haste being present.
Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24. "The burden is on those seeking the exception to show the need for it."
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the
absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). "The Government will be
free, upon retrial, to prove, if it can, that the search was reasonable .... " Foster v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5
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it "[t]he State ...failed to meet its burden of proof showing that the warrantless entry was justified under the emergency doctrine."2 5 None of the
judges who heard this case disagreed with the emergency doctrine itself,
except for Judge Seiler of the Missouri Supreme Court who, in his dissent
in State v. Sutton,26 felt that there was no need for the adoption of such a
rule in Missouri. Judge Finch, dissenting in State v. Sutton, stated his view
as follows:
I am in agreement with the principal opinion that the emergency
doctrine is a proper one and should be adopted in this state ....
My disagreement with the principal opinion relates not to the
validity of the emergency rule, but to the sufficiency of the evidence on the motion to suppress
to justify application of the emergency doctrine in this case. 27
The court of appeals recognized the constitutionality of such an exception
when it said:
We recognize the salutory and empirical doctrine of an emergency
or exigency making reasonable a warrantless entry and possible
search of a home, and further recognize that the Supreme Court
of Missouri has the prerogative of accepting that doctrine, but
the
28
record here fails to support the application of that doctrine.
No emergency was established in Root because of one of two possibilities:
(1) there was no emergency or (2) the state failed to prove that there was an
emergency. Perhaps the two are so closely related that a distinction such as
this is meaningless; but even if such an emergency is present, it must be
remembered that the state has the burden of persuasion to prove that the
officers did in fact reasonably believe an emergency existed.2 9
Since no emergency existed in this case or at least was not established
by the state, the evidence should have been excluded, since it was the
product of an illegal search.3 0 Because they had no warrant to search and
their search was not shown by the state to fall within any exception to the
warrant requirement, the Missouri Supreme Court should have reversed
United States, 281 F.2d 310, 312 (1960); R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEAR ES AND SEIZURES
383 (1964).
25. 438 F.2d at 365.
26. 454 S.W.2d 481, 488 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (dissenting opinion).
27. State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481, 493 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (dissenting
opinion).
28. 438 F.2d at 365.
29. Delaware set the criterion that the state must show to be the "reasonableness of the belief of the police as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence
of the emergency in fact." Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 1967). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Root also said the test was one of reasonable
belief. 438 F.2d at 364.
80. Evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure by the State is inadmissible against defendant in a criminal case because admission thereof
would violate his constitutional security against unreasonable search and
seizure.
State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 209, 159 S.W.2d 794, 797 (1942). See also State v.
Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924).
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the conviction. Since the conviction was vacated by the federal court, the
doctrine is not law today in Missouri. But the Missouri Supreme Court has
shown that it will apply the emergency exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, especially if the saving of a human life is
3
involved. '
ROBERT M. HiLL

"SO LONG AS SHE REMAINS SINGLE"
CONSTRUCTION AND VALIDITY
Lewis v. Searles'
At the age of ninety-five, Hattie L. Lewis, who had never married,
sought a declaratory judgment to quiet title to certain real estate and, in
the process, construe a clause of her aunt's will which read as follows:
Second, I devise to my niece, Hattie L. Lewis, all my real and personal property of which I may die seized and possessed, so long as
she remains single and unmarried. In the event that the said
Hattie L. Lewis shall marry, then and in this event I desire that all
of my property, both real and personal be divided equally between
my nieces and nephews as follows, to the said Hattie L. Lewis, an
undivided one third, to Letitia A. LaForge, wife of A. C. LaForge,
an undivided
one third, and to James R. Lewis an undivided one
third.2
The plaintiff was thirty-eight years old when the will was executed and
fifty-three when the testatrix died. Letitia A. LaForge and James R. Lewis,
niece and nephew of the testatrix, survived her but died before the commencement of this suit, leaving descendants who were defendants in this
action.3
The trial court held that the testatrix intended to give plaintiff a
life estate and
that upon the death of said plaintiff that the fee title to said real
estate vest in fee simple one-third to plaintiff, Hattie L. Lewis, onethird to Letitia A. LaForge and one-third to James K. Lewis, or
to their descendants, herein above named.4
31. As to the fate of Helen Francis Sutton Root, the defendant, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that
the State has the right upon the reversal of a conviction based in part
upon unconstitutional evidence to retry the defendant without the tainted
evidence. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969). We see no reason to
distinguish between a reversal of a conviction on direct appeal and a release obtained by means of the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.
438 F.2d at 365 n.l.
1. 452 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1970).
2. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Judgment was entered giving plaintiff a life estate and an undivided onethird interest in fee subject to her life estate. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held the plaintiff received a fee simple estate subject
to divestiture of an undivided two-thirds interest in the event of her marriage.5
The major issue before the court was construction of the phrase "so
long as she remains single and unmarried." Numerous cases have construed
provisions similar to the one at bar as devising only a life estate,6 but the
Lewis court distinguished precedent and held a fee simple interest was conveyed. The cardinal rule of will construction is to ascertain the intent of the
testator from the language of the document as a whole,7 and, unless it
would contravene an established rule of law or public policy, such intent
must be given effect.8 The court indicated a preference for passing a fee
simple interest if the intent of the testator was to support the devisee or
if the testator had some other reasonable purpose. The court also made
numerous references to the essence of the construction issue, the search for
an expression of the true intent of the testator. Although not expressly
overruling leading cases in Missouri, Lewis certainly indicates a trend
toward construction of such provisions as devises of fee simple estates.
In construing a will, the absence of specific provisions may be relevant
in determining the testator's intent. Without indicating the decisiveness of
the omissions, the court in Lewis took careful note of what the will did not
contain. No mention was made in the will of the contingency of plaintiff's
death or of a gift or limitation over upon plaintiff's death.9 This is significant because such silence could result in total or partial intestacy if the
devise were only a life estate. Further, it was not stated whether the nephew
5. Id. at 159. The following cases from other states are in accord: Kettler v.
Gandy, 270 Ala. 494, 119 So. 2d 913 (1960); Cumming v. Pendleton, 112 Conn. 569,
153 A. 175 (1931); Ramsey v. Holder, 291 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1956); Kohout v. Kohout,
4 Ohio Misc. 38, 203 N.E.2d 869 (1965).
6. See In re Bematas' Estate, 162 Cal. App. 2d 693, 328 P.2d 539 (1958); Eller
v. Wages, 220 Ga. 58, 136 S.E.2d 730 (1964); Rhodus v. Proctor, 433 S.W.2d 625
(Ky. 1968); King v. King, 234 Miss. 862, 108 So. 2d 220 (1959); Riesmeyer v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 180 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1944); Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368, 28
S.W.2d 999 (1930); Tillerson v. Taylor, 282 Mo. 204, 220 S.W. 950 (1920).
7. In re Greenwald's Estate, 19 Cal. App. 2d 291, 65 P.2d 70 (1937); Stern v.
Stem, 410 Ill. 377, 102 N.E.2d 104 (1951); Prior v. Prior, 395 S.W.2d 438 (Mo.
1965); Smoot v. Harbur, 357 Mo. 511, 209 S.W.2d 249 (En Banc 1948); In re Flyer's Will, 53 Misc. 2d 476, 279 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sur. Ct. 1967); In re Lenhart's Estate,
344 Pa. 358, 25 A.2d 725 (1942); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242 (1944).
8. In re Cuneo's Estate, 60 Cal. 2d 196, 384 P.2d 1, 32 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1963);
In re Hampton's Estate, 262 Cal. App. 2d 532, 68 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1968); Norton
v. Jordan, 360 IIl. 419, 196 N.E. 475 (1935); In re Lawtons Estate, 347 Mich. 148,
79 N.W.2d 468 (1956); In re Hill's Estate, 432 Pa. 269, 247 A.2d 606 (1968); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 242, comment c at 1198 (1944).
9. 452 S.W.2d at 156. The importance of a gift over was noted in Buschmeyer v. Eikermann, 378 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1964), where the court construed "as
long as she remain a single person" as being words of limitation and held the
devisee received a determinable life estate. The court indicated that in determining
the estate from language in the will it would place much importance on the gift
over only upon marriage as intent to pass a determinable fee, but felt bound by
Winget to hold the devisee took only a determinable life estate. See Fratcher,
Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 82, 94-95 (1965).
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and niece were required to survive plaintiff in order to receive their respective one-third interests. The absence of a gift over upon death is significant
when the presumption against partial intestacy is considered. In the absence
of an express contrary intent or necessary implication, the testator is presumed to have intended to avoid intestacy and dispose of his entire estate. 10
The presumption requires that a provision not be construed to result in
intestacy "if by any reasonable construction it can be avoided." 11 Thus, the
absence of a gift over indicates a preference for construing the provision as
a fee simple rather than a life estate. Although these omissions were not
held controlling, the opinion indicates they support a fee simple construction.
In Winget v. Gay1 2 the court held language similar to that in issue to
be words of limitation and not a condition; since an estate so limited may
last for life, it was held to be a life estate although it terminated upon
marriage. 13 The Lewis court distinguished Winget merely by noting the
failure of the court in Winget to mention a predecessor statute of section
474.480, RSMo 1959.'. This statute eliminated the necessity of the words
"heirs and assigns"' 5 and creates a presumption in favor of an estate in fee
simple, if no intention appears to create only an estate for life and no
further devise is made to take effect upon death. Although words of inheritance have never been required to pass a fee simple estate by will, there
10. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 823 (Mo.
1969); Shaw v. Wertz, 369 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. 1963); 95 C.J.S. Wills § 615 (1957).
11. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 615 (1957).
12. 325 Mo. 368, 28 S.W.2d 999 (1930).
13. Id. at 372, 28 S.W.2d at 1000. See Riesmeyer v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
180 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo. 1944), where the parties agreed a life estate was conveyed
by the words "so long as she should remain single," and the court noted that the
construction that such language creates a life estate "has the support of judicial
authority." It is at least arguable that an estate so limited, could last beyond life
since a person single upon death remains single. See In re Brown, 119 Kan. 402, 239
P. 747 (1925), where the court construed "for as long as life doth last" as devising
a fee simple.
14. § 474.480, RSMo 1959 [now § 474.480, RSMo 1969] states:
In all devises of lands or other estate in this state, in which the words
"heirs and assigns", or "heirs and assigns forever", are omitted, and no expressions are contained in the will whereby it appears that the devise was
intended to convey an estate for life only, and no further devise is made of
the devised premises, to take effect after the death of the devisee to whom
the same is given, it shall be understood to be the intention of the testator
thereby to devise an absolute estate in the same, and the devise conveys an
estate in fee simple to the devisee, for all of the devised premises.
This statute was effective in substantially the same form when Winget was decided.
15. Id. See Tillerson v. Taylor, 282 Mo. 204, 220 S.W. 950 (1920), decided
only ten years earlier than Winget. There the court took notice of the statute, which
was in similar form, but found an intent to create only a life estate. In Tillerson
the language construed was the following:
I give and bequeath unto my esteemed wife ... to have and to hold the
same and enjoy during her widowhood or so long as she remains my
widow. If she remarries or in the event of her remarrying again, I desire
that all the property should be divided equally between my brothers and
sisters and my wife and her brothers and sisters all sharing alike and equal
with my wife. Id. at 207, 220 S.W. at 950.
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was no presumption at common law that a devise passed a fee simple. 16
Today, however, in practically all jurisdictions in the United States there
is a presumption that a devise is in fee, and in most jurisdictions statutes
produce this result.17 The court in Lewis notes that if a condition had not
been attached to the devise, a fee simple absolute would have been passed,1s
and it is well settled that to cut down an estate in fee, words of a subsequent
limiting provision must be as clear and decisive as those of the prior
clauses. 10 Although courts in some cases have applied the "implication"
theory20 and written in the words "or upon her death" 2 ' to find that only
a life estate was devised where the will made no mention of the devisee's
death, the Lewis court found that the Missouri statute requires all estates
to pass in fee simple if no intent is expressed to create a life estate or no
further devise is made to take effect after death. 22 The court also noted
the importance of the gift over being effective only upon marriage when
it said: "if she had intended to make the gift over effective on death, she
23
should have said so, as various cases indicate."
The court in Lewis refers to the following factors which "mitigate
for" 24 the construction of such a provision as a determinable fee: (1) the
widow being given part of the same property in fee upon re-marriage, (2)
the absence of both a gift over upon death and a residuary clause, and
(3) the existence of a statute eliminating the necessity for words of inheritance. 2 5 Although no single factor was held decisive, the above offer
guidance on drafting a provision to fulfill the testator's true intent.
In Lewis the practical consideration of the value of the two possible
estates must not be overlooked; as the court states, "the testatrix dearly
,,26
intended for plaintiff to have a greater estate if she did not marry ...
16. Doe d. Crutchfield v. Pearce, 145 Eng. Rep. 1427 (Ex. 1815); Roe d. Kirby
v. Holmes, 95 Eng. Rep. 697 (K.B. 1757); L. Sarms &A. Smrrn, THE LAw oF FtrruRE
INTEIMM

§ 496 (2d ed. 1956).

17. Union Trust Co. v. Madigan, 183 Ark. 158, 35 S.W.2d 349 (1931); Cahill
v. Cahill, 402 Ill. 416, 84 N.E.2d 380 (1949); Hopson's Trustee v. Hopson, 282 Ky.
181, 138 S.W.2d 365 (1940); Shaw v. Wertz, 369 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. 1963); Kohout v.
Kohout, 4 Ohio Misc. 38, 203 N.E.2d 869 (1965); Fink v. Stein, 158 Pa. Super. 464,
45 A.2d 249 (1946). See L. Smrs &A. SmrrT, THE L w oFuur IN
s §§ 49697 (2d ed. 1956). As § 497 states: "If there is no language which could be considered
as a gift over, it takes rather dear language to indicate that only a life estate is intended."
18. 452 S.W.2d at 156.
19. Vaughan v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328 (1950); Middleton
v. Dudding, 183 S.W. 443 (Mo. En Banc 1916).
20. Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 484, 488 (1960) states: "In such a situation the courts
have readily found an implied gift on death as well as marriage, especially where
the gift over is to issue or descendants of the testator." See Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo.
368, 28 S.W.2d 999 (1930); Tillerson v. Taylor, 282 Mo. 204, 220 S.W. 950 (1920).
21. See Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368, 28 S.W.2d 999 (1930).
22. 452 S.W.2d at 158.
23. Id. at 159.
24. Id. at 157, citing 1951 WAsH. U.L.Q. 595.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 159. Without discussing values of the two possible estates, the court
explicitly states the dear intent was that plaintiffs share be reduced upon marriage. The court must have considered the value of the estate in order to effect
the true intent of the testatrix.
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If the provision is construed as passing a life estate in the whole, subject
to divestiture upon marriage into a fee simple interest in an undivided
one-third, it may be to plaintiff's advantage to marry. Since she was fiftythree years old when the will was probated, the value of the one-third
interest in fee might well exceed the value of the life estate. It is evident
that if the actual intent of the testatrix was to support the devisee or to
provide an incentive not to marry, the general intent would be to reduce
the estate upon marriage, 27 and it would not seem logical or reasonable to
reduce a life estate to a fee simple interest in one-third of the property.
However, the court merely notes this consideration without further analysis
or indication of weight given the respective values.
The second issue, although of lesser importance in this case, is that of
validity of the provision. Many older cases in Missouri and elsewhere have
followed the general rule that forfeiture provisions in total restraint of
marriage are void as against public policy.28 Dating from at least the Roman
civil law, 29 the rule is based on the principle of freedom to marry. The
actual basis of the rule may have been a public policy favoring population
growth under the guise of freedom to marry.3 0 In England this policy conflicted with the policy of allowing at least some parental choice in choosing
children's spouses, but was supported by views regarding religion. 3 ' It
should be noted that courts have consistently held the conveyance valid and
effective even when the forfeiture provision was held to be against public
32
policy.
In contrast to the general rule on total restraint, partial restraints on
marriage have long been held valid in prohibiting marriage to a certain
class, person, religion, or until reaching a certain age. 83 The general rule
has, moreover, been subject to many exceptions, 34 the most prominent being
that of second marriages. 35 Men were said to "have a sort of mournful
27. Id. at 159. This same reasoning would seem to apply whether the specific
intent was to reduce the estate, or to transfer property to others when no longer
needed by the devisee.
28. See Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266, 46 Am. R. 598 (1883); Randall
v. Marble, 69 Me. 310, 31 Am. R. 281 (1879); Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496,
129 S.W. 949 (1910); Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S.W. 665 (1910); Williams
v. Cowden, 13 Mo. 211 (1850); In re Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E.2d 658 (1939);
In re Catlin, 97 Misc. 223, 160 N.Y.S. 1034 (Sur. Ct. 1916); Goffe v. Goffe, 37 R.I.
542, 94 A. 2 (1915); L. SmrEs & A. SAirr, THE LAw OF FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1514
(2d ed. 1956). See also Annots., 122 A.L.R. 7 (1939), and 45 A.L.R. 1220 (1926); 96
C.J.S. Wills § 985 (1957); Browder, Conditions & Limitations in Restraint of
Marriage,39 MicH. L. Rv. 1288 (1941).
29. 6 R.

POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

850 (1970) states:

In invalidating all provisions in restraint of marriage, the Romans, undoubtedly influenced by the ravages of their civil wars, seem to have
stressed the importance of unhampered growth of population.
30. See Winters v. Miller, 23 Ohio Misc. 73, 74, 261 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1970).
31. 6 R. POWELL,

32.
33.

REAL PROPERTY
850 (1970).
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 424, comment
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 425, comments

d at 2478 (1944).
b-e at 2484-85 (1944); Annot,

50 A.L.R.2d 740 (1956).
34. Annot., 122 A.L.R. 7, 9 (1960).
35. See Wise v. Crandall, 215 S.W. 245 (Mo. 1919); Dumey v. Schoeffler, 24
Mo. 170, 69 Am. Dec. 422 (1857); Dumey v. Sasse, 24 Mo. 177 (1857); Walsh
v. Mathews, 11 Mo. 131 (1847).
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More recent
property right, so to speak, in the viduity of their wives .... 3,6
opinion,3a however, indicates that the donor may attach a provision divesting an estate upon marriage to carry out a reasonable purpose, except
where it is evident such conditions were attached through caprice. 38 The
Restatement of Property, for example, follows the general rule that provisions in total restraint of any first marriage are void. 89 However, it makes
an exception if the "dominant motive" of the conveyor is to support the
and states that each case must be
conveyee until the event of marriage,
40
determined by its own circumstances.
It should be noted that the Restatement clearly distinguishes first and
second marriages in considering the validity of the conditions. 41 This distinction indicates the two situations are not synonomous, and that first
marriage limitations, to be valid, will require more evidence of an intent
to support than second marriage limitations. The Lewis court suggests
"that the cases dealing with devises to widows ... are fully applicable in
our situation," 42 thus by implication attributing little importance to the
first or second marriage distinction. However, it is not dear whether this
statement refers to the validity of the restraint or only to the construction
issue; prior cases indicate the distinction still exists when considering
validity.43
The decision in Lewis recognizing the validity of the condition follows
the rationale dearly stated in Winget v. Gay.4 4 There the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a similar provision, finding that the testator's purpose was to provide support for a semi-invalid step-daughter until the obligation might be assumed by a husband. The court stated that "when all
circumstances are considered," 4 5 if the testator's intent was to provide
support, the purpose and provision did not "run counter" to public policy. 46
The Lewis court, while noting that its decision "perhaps goes one step beyond the holding in Winget," 47 found that the wording of the will expressed
the testatrix's intent to provide support for plaintiff until such time as
she married.4 8
In earlier cases, decisions on validity frequently revolved around find-

36. Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S.W. 667 (1910).
37. Anderson v. Crawford, 202 Iowa 207, 207 N.W. 571 (1926); Winters v.
Miller, 23 Ohio Misc. 73, 261 N.E.2d 205 (1970). See generally RESTATEMENT OF
852 (1970).
PROPERTY § 424 (1944); 6 R. PowEL., REAL PROPERTY
38. Annot., 122 A.L.R. 11, 12 (1939).
39. REsTATm NTrOF PROPERTY § 424 (1944).
40. Id., comment e at 2479. See Winters v. Miller, 23 Ohio Misc. 73, 261
N.E.2d 205 (1970), where the court remands for further evidence, but indicates if
the dominant motive is to support then the provision will be given effect.
41. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 425 (1944).
42. 452 S.W.2d at 159.
43. See cases cited note 35 supra.
44. 325 Mo. 368, 28 S.W.2d 999 (1930).
45. Id. at 372, 28 S.W.2d at 1000.
46. Id.
47. 452 S.W.2d at 156.
48. Id.
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ing such a provision a limitation rather than a condition.4 9 A substantial
body of authority exists determining the validity of the provision by the
form in which it was written. 50 A restraint in the form of a limitation was
valid, but a restraint in the form of a condition subsequent was void. 1
Thus, a bequest to a daughter "so long as she remain single" would be valid;
but a devise to the daughter and her heirs "but, if she marry to another"
would be void.52 Several decisions have construed the language as a condition or limitation as they deem best.5 3 The court in Lewis noted this confusion, and indicated that a devise that is to be reduced in event of marriage
is generally held to be a condition subsequent.5 4 The provision in this case
was in the form of a limitation, but the court did not emphasize the distinction. Powell on Real Property notes that in some jurisdictions such a
distinction is the "tail that wags the dog" and enables courts to uphold
the validity of provisions beginning "so long as" and deny effect to those
stating "on condition that". 55
In deciding the validity question, the Lewis court placed primary importance on the intent of the testatrix and found the required intent to
support in the wording of the will itself. 56 At first glance the decision seems
to follow the Restatement test of "dominant motive,"5 7 but since the
Restatement requires a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, 58
it is arguable that different evidentiary rules are employed to determine the
testator's intent. The two rules may be somewhat at odds; since the court
in Lewis found the intent to support from the wording itself, it is not
clear that circumstances sufficient to satisfy the Restatement rule were present. However, the court does mention the plaintiff's age, indicating some
attention to the surrounding circumstances as evidence of the testatrix's
intent. It should be noted that opposite results could be reached by emphasizing quite different evidence of the testator's intent, i.e., wording versus
circumstances.

49. 6 R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY 851 (1970). See Anderson v. Crawford,
202 Iowa 207, 207 N.W. 571 (1926); Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368, 28 S.W.2d 999
(1930).
50. See Vaughn v. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 437 (1859); Estate of Horgan, 91 Cal. App.
2d 618, 205 P.2d 706 (1949). See also Winters Nat. Bank 8 Trust Co. v. Shawen, 33
Ohio Op. 2d 28, 205 N.E.2d 135 (1964); L. Snms & A. SMIm, Tim LAw OF FUruR
INTEREmSTS § 1514 (2d ed. 1956). See Harmon v. Brown, 58 Ind. 207 (1877); Anderson v. Crawford, 202 Iowa 207, 207 N.W. 571 (1926); Ruggles v. Jewett, 213 Mass.
167, 99 N.E. 1092 (1912); In re Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93, 62 A. 368 (1905).
51. See authorities cited note 50 supra.
52. L. Simms & A. SMITH, Tim LAw oF FtrruR INTEREsrs § 1514, at 401 (2d ed.
1956).
53. In re Fitzgerald's Estate, 161 Cal. 319, 119 P. 96 (1911); Nunn v. Justice,
278 Ky. 811, 129 S.W.2d 564 (1939); In re Miller's Will, 159 N.C. 123, 74 S.E. 888
(1912); In re Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93, 62 A. 368 (1905); Schaeffer v. Messersmith, 10 Pa. County Ct. 366 (1890); L. Smms & A. SmrrH, Tm LAw OF Ftrrum
INrEREsTs § 1514 (2ded. 1956).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

452 S.W.2d at 154.
6 R. PowEL, REAL PROPERTY 851 (1970).
452 S.W.2d at 156.
RESTATEMENT oF PROPERTY § 424, comment e at 2479 (1944).
Id.
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It must be remembered that Lewis was a first marriage situation. The
court found the intent of the testatrix was to provide support for the niece
until marriage, holding valid the provision which in effect was a restraint
on marriage. 59 Although neither Lewis nor any of the cases cited emphasize
the age of the devisee, it is the writer's opinion that this fact must have in0
fluenced the court's decision. The court in In re Dettmer's Will,6
in holding a condition restraining remarriage void, placed much emphasis on the
fact that the beneficiary was only thirty-four years old when the will was
executed. The condition if valid would force her to live in celibacy or
adultery for the remainder of her life or forfeit the gift. 61 It is submitted,
after a review of cases in Missouri and elsewhere, that if the devisee, especially in the first marriage situation, is very young when the will is probated or a possible motive of the testator could be to cut off issue, the provision will not be given effect. The beneficiary's age, physical ability, and
capacity to earn are very persuasive factors when considering the reasonable purpose of the testator.62 In Lewis the plaintiff was fifty-three when
the will was probated and ninety-five when this action was brought, and
in Winget the devisee was a semi-invalid. Kettler v. Gandy63 and Ramsey
4
v. HolderG
held limitations similar to Lewis valid, but in both cases the
beneficiaries never married and were dead when the cases were decided.
It is further submitted that circumstances such as these are found in a
majority of the cases giving effect to the provision in first marriage situations. Cases holding the provision invalid rarely mention the surrounding
circumstances, but the inference may be drawn that no unusual facts exist
to support holding the provision valid.00 In the final analysis such circum59. 452 S.W.2d at 156.
60. 176 Misc. 512, 27 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sur. CL), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 1032, 30
N.Y.S.2d 333, appeal denied, 263 App. Div. 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1941), afr'd, 43
N.E.2d 830, 289 N.Y. 597 (1942). Here the devisee married when sixteen years old
and her husband died when she was twenty-one. The testator, a friend, knew she
was of limited means and made several gifts to her during his life. When she was
thirty-four the testator executed a will devising property to her "upon condition
that she shall not remarry . . ." In 176 Misc. at 516, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 613, the

court states in holding the provision invalid:
The present beneficiary was only twenty-one years of age when she became a widow. Can it be asserted that merely by reason of the fact that
she had attained this status, she was less eligible to become a successful
wife and mother than other girls of her own age, many of whom do not
marry until several years later? At the date of the will she was but thirtyfour, an age at, or subsequent to, which many successful marriages are
consummated. Had the testator died then, his condition against marriage, if validated, would have compelled her, though still a young woman,
to live for a probable period of thirty-two and a half years, almost equal
to the previous years of her life, in celibacy or adultery, or else forfeit
the gift.
61. 176 Misc. at 516, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
62. Id. Cf. Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368, 28 S.W.2d 999 (1930).
63. 270 Ala. 494, 119 So. 2d 913 (1960).
64. 291 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1956). The validity question retains little significance after death of a beneficiary before marriage, and a court can hold the
provision valid with no practical effect on the parties. See Eller v. Wages, 220
Ga. 58, 136 S.E.2d 730 (1964); Rhodus v. Proctor, 433 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1968).
65. The following cases all involved wills devising property to unmarried
daughters with provisions reducing the devise upon marriage: Sullivan v. Garesche,
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stances may determine the effect given the provision regardless of how
explicit the intent of a testator to support or accomplish another "reasonable purpose" may be stated in the will. The Lewis court reaffirms the
position in Missouri that a provision in total restraint of marriage will be
valid, even in the first marriage situation, if the intent of the testator is to
provide support or promote some other reasonable purpose. Although the
court finds this intent in the wording of the will itself, the circumstances
surrounding the-devise were extremely conducive to holding the provision
valid.
JoHN R. LONGr-Tr

COMMIUNITY-WIDE ARCHITECTURAL CONTROLS
IN MISSOURI
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley"
Dimiter Stoyanoff and his wife applied for a permit to build a home
in Ladue. The Ladue Architectural Board of Review disapproved of the
Stoyanoffs' plans for a pyramid-shaped residence with a flat top and triangular windows or doors at one or more corners. Consequently, the Ladue
Building Commissioner denied the permit and the Stoyanoffs petitioned
for a peremptory writ of mandamus. 2 The Circuit Court of St. Louis County
issued the writ upon its finding that the ordinances establishing and governing the architectural boards violated the Missouri Constitution by depriving
the Stoyanoffs of their property without due process of law.4
The Missouri Supreme Court was faced with three main questions on
appeal: (1) Whether Ladue's regulation and restriction of the exterior design of a building is a valid and constitutional exercise of the police power;
(2) whether the creation of an architectural board to promote style conformity is authorized by state enabling statutes; and (3) whether the decision-making power can be delegated to an administrative board without
specific standards to guide it. The court answered all questions in the affirmative, thereby overruling the virtually identical 1961 case of State ex rel.
Magidson v. Henze 5 and lifting the aesthetic factor another rung up the
ladder of legitimacy among the accepted purposes of governmental regulation of private property.
229 Mo. 496, 129 S.W.2d 949 (1910); Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S.W. 665
(1910); Williams v. Cowden, 13 Mo. 211 (1850).
1. 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
2. Id. at 306.
3. Ladue, Mo., Ordinance 131, March 18, 1940, as amended, Ladue, Mo.,
Ordinance 281, June 14, 1948. The substance of the ordinance is summarized by
the Stoyanoff court, 458 S.W.2d at 310-11.
4. 458 S.W.2d at 306.
5. 342 S.W.2d 261 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961) (did not consider the effect of
§ 89.040, RSMo 1969).
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Reversing the lower court, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that
architectural controls in residential neighborhoods preserve property values,
and, therefore, promote the general welfare. 6 The court was thus able to
attach the aesthetic considerations to a valid use of the police power under
section 89.020, RSMo 1969. But it was section 89.040, RSMo 1969, which
served as the foundation for upholding the Ladue ordinance, despite the
Magidson case and the weight of authority in the United States. 7 That
statute provides, in part, that zoning regulations "be made with reasonable
consideration.., to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability
for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the values of buildings .

,s"8Section 89.040 had not been argued in Magidson and the

court ruled that section 89.020 alone would not support an architectural
board in University City.9 The Stoyanoff court also distinguished the University City ordinance from the Ladue scheme; the Ladue ordinance calls
for a public hearing, with notice to the applicant and for appeal to both
the board and the city council. Such a procedural scheme provides a check
on possible abuses of discretion by the administrative body. It also helps
overcome a lack-of-sufficient-standards argument, inherent in most aestheticlinked zoning regulations. The gist of the Ladue standard for approval of
a building is that the proposed design conform to both proper architectural
standards and to surrounding structures. Disapproval is authorized if the
structure would be "unsightly, grotesque or unsuitable." 10 Relying on State
ex rel. Ludlow v. Guffey,"' the court stated that general standards are
sufficient to guide the board in determining the suitability of any proposed
structure with reference to the character of the surrounding neighborhood,
the adverse effect on the general welfare, and the preservation of property
values in the community.1 2 The court reasoned that the rationale behind
the requirement of definite standards for the exercise of delegated power
is to prevent arbitary actions by the administrative body. Therefore, when
the delineation of a definite rule or standard is impracticable or impossible,
or enforcement of the police regulation requires prompt exercise of judgment,' 3 public hearings, with notice to the applicant and the right to appeal to the city council, are adequate protections against such arbitrariness.
Having carved out statutory authorization for regulation of exterior
building design and having found general standards sufficient to regulate
6. 458 S.W.2d at 309.
7. See Hershman, Beauty as the Subject of Legislative Control, 15 PRAc.
LAW., Feb., 1969, at 20, 25. Typical of the majority view cases is City of West Palm
Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
8. § 89.040, R.SMo 1969.
9. State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze, 342 S.W.2d 261, 265 (St. L. Mo. App.
1961).
10. Ladue, Mo., Ordinance 131, §§ 6, 9, March 18, 1940. If the board cannot
decide if the design falls within either category, the plans are returned to the
building commissioner who may issue the permit. Id. at §§ 10, 11.
11. 306 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. En Banc 1957). For the general rule requiring
definite standards see Lux v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 322 Mo. 342, 346, 15
S.W.2d 343, 345 (En Banc 1929); Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. City of Pagedale, 441 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969).
12. 458 S.W.2d at 312.
13. Id. at 311.
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the use of that power by an administrative body, the court was confronted
with the question of whether the application of the regulation to the Stoyanoffs was so unreasonable or arbitrary as to overcome the presumption of
validity of the legislative act. The court stated that the denial of a building permit for the highly modernistic residence, in an area where the traditional Colonial, French Provincial and English Tudor styles of architecture predominated, was not unreasonable and arbitrary "when the basic
purpose to be served is that of the general welfare of persons in the entire
community."14
The Stoyanoff case joins State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v.
Wieland 15 and Reid v. ArchitecturalBoard of Review 16 as one of the major
decisions in the nation in support of architectural controls. It is quite unlikely, however, that aesthetics will soon become a significant factor in other
related areas of the law concerned with control of property use in Missouri, 17 since Stoyanoff and a subsequent case, State ex rel. Wilkerson v.
Murray,1s have emphasized strongly that mere aesthetic considerations in
themselves are not sufficient to sustain the restrictions under general zoning
ordinances. 19 But there can be little doubt that the overruling of Magidson typifies the present judicial mood which premiered in 1969 in Deimeke
v. State Highway Commission,2 0 when the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
an aesthetic-based state statute requiring the licensing of all junkyards along
the primary highways of the state. The shift in judicial attitude has been
dramatic. Less than a half century ago, the court had said that "regulations
based on aesthetic considerations are not in accord with the spirit of our
democratic institutions." 2' 1 By 1948 the court had decided that aesthetic
considerations would not invalidate an ordinance that had an otherwise

14. Id. at 310.
15. 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
16. 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963). In addition to Ohio, Wisconsin, and now, Missouri, the only other jurisdiction seemingly upholding such ordinances is New Hampshire. See, e.g., Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender v.
Tibbets, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964). However, that case comes close to
supporting the preservation of a historic district, a more traditionally accepted
goal. 17.
See Snadon, Aesthetic Regulation and the Police
Power, 35 Mo. L. REv.
445 (1970); Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial Process,
35 Mo. L. REv. 176 (1970).
18. No. 55,340 (Mo., filed Feb. 8, 1971). This case was reported in the South
Western Reporter Advance Sheets as: 463 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Mo. 1971); however,
the case does not appear under this citation in the South Western Reporter because one of the parties petitioned to have the reporting of the case withheld pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. In this case,
the Missouri Supreme Court accepts the majority view and upholds the ordinance
which, in effect, banned mobile homes in certain residential districts of St. Louis
County.
19. 458 S.W.2d at 310; State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, No. 55,340 (Mo.,
filed Feb. 8, 1971), see note 18 supra.
20. 444 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1969). Stoyanoff answered the main question raised
after the decision in Deimeke: Whether Missouri municipalities could also use the
police power to regulate developments or situations which are not as patently offensive as vehicle graveyards.
21. City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231, 249, 256 S.W. 489, 495 (1923).
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traditional purpose under the police power. 22 The Deimeke case, which
quoted Justice Douglas' famous dicta in Berman v. Parker,23 indicated that
aesthetics could be a major, not just incidental, factor in a valid regulation.
Stoyanoff takes aesthetics to the threshhold of full recognition.
Most courts have had little trouble upholding setback, height, lot area
and floor space restrictions 24 which add to a community's appearance.
The same has been true with regulations against patently offensive conditions such as junkyards and billboards, and with regulations preserving
historic districts. 25 For example, the Missouri court early upheld billboard
regulation in St. Louis by denying their connection with aesthetic considerations (which at that time would have invalidated the ordinance automatically), stating that the signs were a threat to health, safety, and public
morals. 20 When these latter three terms had been stretched to their limits,
attorneys looked to the final term in the usual police power enabling statute,
"general welfare." A growing number of cases recognize an expansion of the
scope of that term.2 7 The court in Stoyanoff construed the term "general
welfare" to include the preservation of property values through municipal
regulation of a non-patently offensive condition, i.e., the design and appearance of residential homes. 28 The ambit of the term "general welfare"
seems at times almost limitless, since the essence of the police power is that
it may only be used to control private property for the public or general
welfare; otherwise, there is an unconstitutional taking of private property
without due process of law. 29 To give "general welfare" too broad a meaning would seemingly make the three preceding terms of "health, safety,
and public morals" superfluous. But the Missouri court recently made
it clear that it has not abandoned the use of these terms30 and in many
cases the specific term would seem more accurate than the general.
Judicial recognition that municipalities may regulate exterior building

22. City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 358 Mo. 681, 216 S.W.2d 475 (1948).
23. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954):
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive ... [t]he values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It
is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean....
24. Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYR.AcusE L. REv. 26, 37-42
(1960).
25. City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); Opinion

of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); City of Santa Fe v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964).

26. St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99,

137 S.W. 929 (En Banc 1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913).

27. See State v. Diamond Motors, 429 P.2d 825 (Hawaii 1967); State ex rel.
Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Mo. 1970); Deimeke v. State Highway
Comm'n, 444 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Mo. 1969); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191

N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); Oregon City v.
Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
28. 458 S.W.2d at 309.
29. See, e.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938).
30. See State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, No. 55,340 (Mo., filed Feb. 8, 1971),
note 18 supra.
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design opens a Pandora's box of problems with which the courts are likely
to be faced as architectural control boards spread:
(1) Can a permit be denied even if the owners of the adjoining property give permission for the construction of the type house submitted to the
architectural board? The answer would seem to be "yes" if the preservation
of property values is for the general welfare and not just that of the adjoining landowners.3 1
(2) What degree of unsightliness is required for disapproval? In
Stoyanoff the city described (and the court did not disagree) the proposed
structure as a "monstrosity of grotesque design."3 2 The unsuitability of a
proposed structure may not always be so dear cut. The chairman of the
Ladue architectural board has said the board has disapproved few of the
applications since the board is only "trying to meet basic standards, and
not make every building a work of art."3 3 Nevertheless, the potential for
abuse is great under an ordinance such as Ladue's.
(8) How much of a potential decrease in property values must be
found? The lower tax base resulting from decreased property values evidently is a major link in connecting regulation of building permits to the
general welfare.3 4 The extent of the decrease in property values necessary
for disapproval introduces another arbitrary fact issue. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Wieland appeared to demand a substantial diminution, 5
but the opinion in Stoyanoff is unclear. A realtor did testify, however, that
the Stoyanoff design would have a substantial adverse effect on surround36
ing property values.
(4) Through whose eyes is the administrative body to look in determining if property values would decrease? The neighbors', who may
actually like the proposed design? Or is it the subsequent purchaser of adjoining property who should be considered since the real proof of the
effect on property values would come only upon resale? Under the Ladue
scheme, a majority of the three-man board of architects may approve a
design without considering property values. Property values only enter
the decision-making process when the board initially disapproves a design,
as in the Stoyanoff case. What constitutes "proper architectural standards"
under the Ladue ordinance depends on the views of the three board members, each of whom must be an architect. Dimiter Stoyanoff was a member of
31. The Texas Supreme Court in 1921 used this reasoning to invalidate an
ordinance requiring the consent of at least three-fourths of the residents in a certain residential district before allowing construction of a business house. In the
decision, Chief Justice Phillips delivered a scathing indictment against the consideration of aesthetics in zoning. Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W.
513 (1921).
32. 458 S.W.2d at 307.
33. Letter from Rex L. Becker, Chairman of the Architectural Board of Review, to Ronald R. McMillin, March 3, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Letter from Rex
L. Becker.]
34. 458 S.W.2d at 309; Deimeke v. State Highway Comm'n, 444 S.W.2d 480,
484 (Mo. 1969).
35. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 265,
69 N.W.2d 217, 219, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
36. 458 S.W.2d at 307.
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the Missouri Association of Registered Architects at the time his design
was disapproved (a fact the court failed to mention) and the chairman of
the Ladue board concedes that "qualified architects do have differences of
opinion."3 7 This highlights the traditional argument against aesthetic zoning, that such regulation places an individual at the mercy of the whims
38
and sentiments of the decision-maker guided by his own sense of "beauty."
(5) What remedy is available to an adjoining landowner if the architectural board approves a design which he, nevertheless, feels will lower
his property values? Although it apparently took 80 years for a homebuilder's challenge of the Ladue ordinances to reach the appellate level,3 9
Stoyanoff shows that an applicant with enough money and determination
can have his "day in court." But had the design been approved, Stoyanoff's
future neighbor might have found it much more difficult to contest the
decision. The Ladue ordinance does not give all aggrieved persons the right
to appeal to the city council, only the applicant. The availability of judicial
review in this context is unclear.4 0 The most feasible-and probably the
most effective-weapon would be widespread publicity to arouse the citizenry
41
to "persuade" the city officials to reconsider their decision.
(6) What degree of uniformity must be present in the neighborhood
before the proposed design is found not to be in conformity? Ladue has enjoyed much success in the courts in protecting its status. It is one of the
finest suburban residential areas of St. Louis, with homes costing an average
of $60,000 to $85,000. It is developed primarily in private subdivisions and
with a minimum of commercial zoning among its 5,000 acres.42 Most cities
have not been as fortunate in their development. For a design to be unsuitable for an area, a certain degree of uniformity must already exist. An ap37. Letter from Rex L. Becker. The board members also may change their
opinions once the building is constructed, but, according to Mr. Becker, when they
have had second thoughts, "they generally are that we should have been more
restrictive."
38. See Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 76, 192
N.E.2d 74, 81 (1963) (dissenting opinion); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 470,
191 N.E.2d 272, 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 740 (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed,
375 U.S. 42 (1963).
39. See note 3 supra.
40. Section 536.150, RSMo 1969 sets out possible remedies, including a suit
for injunction, certiorari, mandamus or prohibition in connection with the administrative decision. The neighbor could also seek an injunction against and
damages for a private nuisance. See generally W. PRossER, LAw

OF TORTS

611-13

(3d ed. 1964).
The complexities of bringing such actions are beyond the scope of this casenote.
Once it is determined that a party has standing and a remedy is available, the
plaintiff's burden of proof would be overwhelming, especially since the board's
approval is evidence that the design meets proper architectural standards and conforms to the surrounding property. In fact, § 536.150, RSMo 1969 states "the court
shall not substitute its discretion for discretion legally vested in such administrative
officer or body....
41. See St. Louis Post Dispatch, March 7, 1971, § A, at 3, col. 3 (junk car
lot). For an example of how public reaction can result in the retention of "architecture" abhorred by the neighbors see St. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 23, 1971,
§ A, at 2, col. 3 (a Clayton, Mo. outhouse).
42. See Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 36 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963);
Deacon v. City of Ladue, 294 S.W.2d 616, 622 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
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plicant whose design has been disapproved should look to this fact issue
as one line of offense.
(7) Can the board presently deny a permit application on the ground
that future property values will be preserved? This situation would arise,
for instance, if the proposed structure is to be built on recently annexed
land which is undeveloped in part, but which will support much residential
housing in the near future.
The seven aforementioned questions by no means exhaust the problem
areas opened up by the new prominence of aesthetics in zoning. But many
of those problems may be avoided (or at least camouflaged) by the careful
drafting of both the enabling statute and city ordinance. The ordinance
should include, inter alia, a statement of purpose spelling out the relationship between design control and the public welfare; an effective and expeditious procedure for notice and appeal to the city council by the applicant 43 and, possibly, by any other aggrieved party; and the articulation of
standards which, although general enough to allow flexibility, are sufficiently
concrete so as to minimize arbitrariness under the circumstances. 44 Despite
the approval of the Ladue ordinance, it may be desirable to include provisions to require unanimity in design disapproval 45 and to exclude any
mention of "appropriate standards of beauty" or "happiness of the community" because both phrases smack of aesthetics' ephemerality. 46 A con-

nection between the control and a comprehensive building plan also cuts
against the lack-of-standards argument in a jurisdiction not as obliging as
Missouri in Stoyanoff. 47 A draftsman should also include a provision for the
prevention of excessive similarity to guard against the one-design subdivisions which can have as detrimental an effect on adjoining property values
as dissimilarity.48
The power to adopt such an ordinance must, of course, be found in
the enabling statute; but Stoyanoff, Reid and Wieland suggest that the
statute's language need not be specific and an imaginative attorney probably can find at least an arguable statutory basis in any jurisdiction.
The continued expansion of aesthetic considerations in zoning, especially in community-wide zoning controls, depends largely on the courts.
The semantical gymnastics in judicial construction of the phrases in the
traditional police power statute have been mentioned. The Missouri Supreme Court seemingly overlooked the fact that the Ladue ordinance had
a bootstrapping effect, i.e., aesthetics is a valid goal only if property value
is preserved, yet the property value is measured in terms of aesthetic displeasure. These techniques and the court's language in Stoyanoff leave little
43. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AmcAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 8.58-.60 (1968).
44. As noted above, conformity with "proper architectural standards" was
the basic guideline for the architectural board under the Ladue ordinance. However, determining what is "proper" is no less subjective than defining the term
"beauty."
45. 2 R. ANDESON, supra note 43.
46. Both of these phrases were contained in the Ladue ordinance but were
not discussed by the court.
47. See 2 R. ANDFsON, supra note 43.

48. The Ladue scheme has no provisions expressly restricting excessive similarity.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5
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doubt that the court finds aesthetic considerations both necessary and desirable. 49 Yet the prevailing test in Missouri for judicial review of legislative zoning decisions was developed and rigidified long before aesthetics
(and the accompanying potential for abuse) began playing such an active
part in the controversy between private property rights and public welfare.5 0 As long as the aesthetic factor is valid only in conjunction with a
traditional purpose, this same test of reasonableness and arbitrariness, which
is weighted heavily in favor of legislative actions, will apply. Should this
scope of review permit too many abuses, the progress of the aesthetic factor
toward legitimacy would likely be halted. 5 1 Recognition of aesthetics as
a sui generis purpose for zoning would appear to be a wiser course. The
courts would then be unshackled from precedent and free to formulate a
new test or to create for themselves a greater role in reviewing aesthetic
zoning cases.5 2 The latter course seems to be the most workable and would
put city governing bodies on notice that a rubber-stamp approval of the
architectural board's decision will not automatically raise a shield against
close judicial scrutiny.
RONALD R. MCMILLIN

49. The court stated:
In this time of burgeoning urban areas, congested with people and structures, it is certainly in keeping with the ultimate ideal of general welfare
that the Architectural Board, in its function, preserve and protect existing
areas in which structures of a general conformity of architecture have been
erected. 458 S.W.2d at 310.
50. See Tofle, Criteriafor Determining the Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances in Missouri,35 Mo. L. REv. 572 (1970).
51. Arguably, the recognition of aesthetics as a valid purpose for control
stifles architectural creativity by over-emphasizing conformity. But according to
the Ladue architectural board chairman, "The practical result in Ladue has been
a general upgrading of architectural design ...and general acceptance by the
citizens... that [the board has] had a beneficial effect on the community." Letter
from Rex L. Becker.
52. The concept of expanding the court's review role depending on the possibilities of abuse of the police power is not new to the Missouri Supreme Court,
which extends the depth of its inquiry when the police power is wielded by a
municipality and not the state. Olympic Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. City of Pagedale,
441 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969).
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THE INNKEEPER'S LIEN IN MISSOURI
Jackson v. Engertl
Plaintiff Genevieve Jackson rented a one room furnished apartment
from defendant Robert Engert for seven dollars a week. Plaintiff paid her
rent by leaving cash on her dresser where the defendant would pick it up.
Claiming that plaintiff's rent was fifty-six dollars in arrears, defendant
changed the lock on plaintiff's room and refused to allow her to remove
her personal belongings. Plaintiff then brought an action for the conversion
of her personal property, valued at $1500, and for $1000 punitive damages,
interest and attorney's fees. 2 Defendant raised as a defense section 419.060,
RSMo 1969,3 which gives to the keeper of an inn, hotel or boardinghouse
a lien on the property of his guests or boarders for charges they have incurred. Defendant sought to bring himself within the purview of this statute
by reference to certain ordinances of the City of St. Louis relating to licensing, inspection, safety and health requirements of hotels, boarding
houses and rooming houses. 4 He contended that because he obtained a
license for a rooming house, he was considered by the City of St. Louis to
be in the same general category as owners of hotels or boardinghouses and
was, therefore, entitled to the lien provided for in section 419.060. The case,
originating in magistrate court, was tried before a jury in circuit court, and
a verdict was directed in favor of the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's
case. 5 The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the trial court
and remanded the case for a new trial, 6 holding that the plaintiff presented
a prima facie case in her action for conversion and that she was entitled to
submit the matter to the jury for determination. 7 The court pointed out
that the defendant had presented no evidence concerning either his status
or that of the plaintiff under section 419.060 and that once such evidence
had been presented at a new trial, it would be for the jury to decide whether
the defendant's rooming house was covered by section 419.060 of the statute. 8 In reaching this decision, the court paused to discuss the scope of the
1. 453 S.W.2d 615 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
2. Id. at 616.
3. § 419.060, RSMo 1969 (in part):
1. The keeper of any inn, hotel or boardinghouse, whether individual,
partnership or corporation, shall have a lien on the baggage and other
property in and about such inn brought to the same by or under the control of his guests or boarders, and upon the wages of such guests or boarders
for the proper charges due him from such guests, or boarders, for the accommodation, board and lodging, and for all money paid for or advanced
to them not to exceed the sum of two hundred dollars, and for such other
extras as are furnished at the request of such guests, and said innkeeper
or hotel keeper shall have the right to detain such baggage and other
property until the amount of such charges are paid and such baggage and
other property shall be exempt from attachment or execution until such
innkeeper's lien and the cost of satisfying it are paid....
4. See ST. Louis, Mo., Rxv.

CODE

ch. 402 (1969).

5. 453 S.W.2d at 616.
6. Id. at 615.
7. Id. at 619.
8. Id. at 618.
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Missouri innkeeper's lien as well as the categories of persons covered by
the statute.
The innkeeper's lien was originally derived from his liability to his
guests. At common law an innkeeper was required to receive all unobjectionable persons who offered themselves as guests as long as he had accommodations and they were willing to pay the reasonable charges incurred.9 In order that guests would be assured of a safe place to rest during
their travels, extraordinary liability was imposed on innkeepers for loss or
injury to their guests' property. An innkeeper at common law was liable
for any loss or injury to the property of his guests caused by his own tortious
conduct or that of his servants or by others for whose presence in the inn
he was responsible.1o He was prima fade liable for loss by fire but could
excuse himself by showing he was free from negligence." However, the innkeeper was not liable for losses due to acts of God or the public enemy, or
the companions or servants of the guest, or for losses from causes inherent
in the property or due to the negligence of the guest.12 The prevailing view
at common law was that the innkeeper was liable as an insurer for all personal property brought by the guest to the inn and lost in the inn.13 This
extraordinary liability could be limited by contract or reasonable rules and
was in some cases limited by statute. Many statutes now mitigate the liability
imposed by common law. 14 These statutes tend to limit both the amount of
liability and the type of property covered. Section 419.010, RSMo 1969 limits
liability for loss of money, jewelry, wearing apparel, baggage or other property of the guest to $200.15 It also provides that there will be no liability for
loss of money, jewelry, or baggage unless actually delivered to the innkeeper by the guest, provided that notice of the section is posted in the office
and every guest room of the hotel. Section 419.030, RSMo 1969 provides

9. Odom v. East Ave. Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mem., 264 App. Div. 985, 37 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1942).
10. See Stoll v. Almon C. Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551, 138 A. 479 (1927); Burton
v. Drake Hotel Co., 237 Il. App. 76 (1925); Cumberland Hotel Operating Co. v.
Hartman, 264 Ky. 300, 94 S.W.2d 637 (1936); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494, 267 S.W. 555 (1925); Babin v. Thormander, 167 So. 241 (La. 1936); Todd v. Natches-Eola Hotels Co., 171 Miss. 577, 157 So.
703 (1954).
11. R. BROWN, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 485 (2d ed. 1955).
12. See Johnson v. Mobile Hotel Co., 27 Ala. App. 145, 167 So. 595, cert.
denied, 232 Ala. 175, 167 So. 596 (1936); Stoll v. Almon C. Judd Co., 106 Conn.
551, 138 A. 479 (1927); National Malted Food Corp. v. Crawford, 254 IlL. App. 415
(1929); Goodyear Tire 8- Rubber Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494,
277 S.W. 555 (1925); Robbins v. Ponchartrain Apart., 175 La. 278, 143 So. 263
(1932); Davidson v. Madison Corp., 231 App. Div. 421, 247 N.Y.S. 789, afrd, 257
N.Y. 120, 177 N.E. 393 (1931); Busby Hotel & Theatre Co. v. Thorn, 125 Okla.
239, 257 P. 314 (1927); Andrew Jackson Hotel v. Platt, 19 Tenn. App. 360, 89
S.W.2d 179 (1927).
13. L.E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32 (1933).
14. See § 419.010, RSMo 1969. See also CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1859 (West 1954);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 44-1 (1958); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 71, § 1 (1969); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 36402 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 140, § 10 (1958); MicH. Cow. LAws
§ 427.101 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.01 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 29:2-4 (1964);
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4721.02 (Page 1954); Txx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4592 (1960).

15. § 419.010, RSMo 1969.
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that an innkeper will not be liable for losses caused by fire unless started
intentionally by the innkeeper or his servants. 16
Both at common law and under modem statutes, an innkeeper is entitled to a lien on the property of his guests for the reasonable charges they
have incurred. This lien was created by law and not by contract. The innkeeper, being required by law to receive the guest and impressed with extraordinary liability for the safety of his property, was given the lien by law
as a sort of equalizing device. The connection, at common law, between the
innkeeper's liability and the innkeeper's lien was discussed in Broadwood v.
Granara.'7 Judge Parke stated:
The principle on which an innkeeper's lien depends is, that he
is bound to receive travellers and the goods which they bring
with them to the inn.... The lien cannot be claimed except in
respect of goods which, in performance of his duty to the public,
he is bound to receive.' 8
In Threfall v. Borwick,19 Justice Mellor stated that:
When, having accommodation, he has received the guest with
his goods and thereby has become liable for their safe custody, it
would be hard if he was not to have a lien upon them. And under
such circumstances the lien must be held to20extend to goods which
he might possibly have refused to receive.
In a subsequent appeal from Threfall, the court said that it was immaterial
whether the innkeeper was obligated to receive the property of the guest;
if he received the goods, and thereby became liable, he was entitled to a
lien. 21At common law, in order for the innkeeper's lien to be valid the
claimed goods had to have been brought to the inn by a person coming in
the character of a guest. It was not necessary, however, that the guest in all
cases be the owner of the goods.2 2 The lien generally extended to all property brought by the guest to the inn, including property not belonging to
the guest when the innkeeper was either ignorant of the true ownership
or knew that the guest had lawful possession of it.23 Some modem statutes,
including Missouri's, 2 4 have extended this lien to cover the wages of the
guest as well.
Some statutory liens have been held to apply only to the property
of the guest and not to the property of third persons, even if brought to
the inn by the guest as his own property. In the Missouri case of Wyckoff
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

§ 419.030, RSMo 1969.
156 Eng. Rep. 499 (Ex. 1854).
Id. at 502.
L.R. 7 Q.B. 711 (1872).
Id. at 713-14.
Threfall v. Borwick, L.R. 10 Q.B. 210 (1875).
Wal v. Garrison, 11 Colo. 515, 19 P. 469 (1888).

23. Id. See also RESTATEENT or SEcuarry § 63 (1941).

24. § 419.060, RISMo 1969.
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v. Southern Hotel Co., 2 5 the court said that since the statute (as it then
existed) both enlarged and restricted the common law in certain respects,
it had repealed the common law. The words of the statute, as interpreted
by the court, applied only to the property of the guest himself. 26 However,
in the later Missouri case of L.E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt,27 the court said
that revisions of the statute, which had extended the lien to all property
brought to the hotel by the guest either "in his possession or under his control," would include the property of third persons which was lawfully in
his possession.2 8 The Lines Music case also upheld the constitutionality of
29
the statute.
At common law an innkeeper had an inchoate right to a lien from the
time board and lodging were furnished. The lien did not become fixed
and certain, however, until the indebtedness was established.3 0 Once the
lien had been established it continued until the innkeeper voluntarily surrendered the goods to the guest or the debt was satisfied. 3 ' An innkeeper
could not sell or pledge property held by him under a lien; he could, however, bring a bill in equity to foreclose it.32 Now, under the statutes, various
methods of enforcing the lien have been provided. In Coates v. Acheson, 33
the court said that if an adequate remedy is provided by statute, a bill in
equity does not lie.
The keeper of a boardinghouse or lodging house had no lien at common law. He was required to resort to a normal civil action to recover for
charges due.3 4 Many modem statutes, however, extend the lien to one or
both of the above. The Missouri statute extends it to boardinghouses but
not to lodging houses.36 In the present case, the important question was
whether or not the defendant was given a lien by section 419.060, which
gives a lien only to keepers of inns, hotels, and boardinghouses. The distinctions between guests, boarders, lodgers, and tenants, as discussed by the
court, therefore deserve serious consideration.
The distinctive features of an inn or hotel are that transient guests
are received and furnished with lodging.3 6 Formerly, to qualify for inn
25. 24 Mo. App. 382 (St. L. Ct. App. 1887).
26. Id. at 388.
27. 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32 (1933).
28. Id. at 754, 60 S.W.2d at 34.
29. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court held in this case that § 13090, RSMo 1929,
which the court interpreted as applying the statutory lien to the property of third
persons brought to the inn by the guest and lawfully in his possession, was constitutional. The court said that the statute did not deny due process of law under
Mo. CoNST. art. 2, § 30 (1875), nor did the statute impair the obligation of contracts under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The court also stated that the effect of the
statute was to re-establish the common law right of a lien to hotel and innkeepers.
Commissioner Westhues said that the common law is the law of our land unless
abrogated by statute or constitution. Section 13090 is no broader than the common
law; therefore, it is not unconstitutional.
30. Coates v. Acheson, 23 Mo. App. 255 (K.C. Ct. App. 1886).
31. Id.
32. Case v. Fogg, 46 Mo. 44 (1870).
33. 23 Mo. App. 255, 261 (K.C. Ct. App. 1886).
34. Turner v. Priest, 48 Ga. App. 109, 171 S.E. 881 (1933).
35. See § 419.060, RSMo 1969, quoted note 3 supra.
36. Juengel v. City of Glendale, 164 S.W.2d 610 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
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status, the establishment was required to furnish not only lodging, but also
food and drink for the guests. 37 This early definition has been narrowed and
modified because of changes in the modes of travel and customs of people.
Facilities for supplying guests with food and drink are no longer essential
requirements for an inn or hotel.38
Today, the hotel or inn generally furnishes accommodations to all persons who are in a condition fit to be received, without regard to any prior
or express agreement as to the duration of their stay. In contrast, a boardinghouse or lodging house furnishes accommodations to such persons as the
proprietor chooses to receive under express contract, for a certain period of
time, and at a certain rate. The crucial distinction between a guest and a
boarder or lodger is that the guest is essentially a transient.30 The court in
Shoecraft v. Bailey,40 quoting from 1 Parson'sContracts, page 628, states:
The guest comes without any bargain for time, remains without
one, and may go when he pleases, paying only for the actual entertainment which he receives; and it is not enough to make [him]
a boarder, and not 41
a guest, that he has staid [sic] a long time in
the inn in this way.
The fact that there has been some negotiated deduction from the regular
charge does not change the rule stated above.4 2 It should also be mentioned that a tenant is distinguishable from guests and lodgers or boarders
in that a tenant acquires an interest in the realty and a right to the exclusive legal possession of the premises occupied.4 3
A guest at an inn may terminate the existing relationship by abandoning his transient character. This may be effected merely by forming an intention to remain indefinitely or permanently.4 4 However, a special contract with an innkeeper, such as one for a weekly rate, made by a person
who has been received as a guest, does not operate to terminate the relation
45
if the party retains his character as a transient.
A lodging or rooming house is defined as a house where lodgings are
let; 46 where bedrooms are furnished; and where there are one or more bedrooms which the proprietor can spare for the purpose of giving lodging to
such persons as he chooses to receive.4 7 It is also a house containing furnished apartments which are let out by the week or by the month without
48
meals.

37. Nelson v. Johnson, 104 Minn. 440, 116 N.W. 828 (1908).
38. Juengel v. City of Glendale, 164 S.W.2d 610, 613 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
39. City of Independence v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 232 P. 1044 (1925).
40. 25 Iowa 553 (1868).
41. Id. at 555.
42. Id.
43. Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 800, 84 S.W.2d 947, 955 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1935).
44. Polk v. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611, 99 N.W. 867 (1904).
45. Holstein v. Phillips, 146 N.C. 366, 59 S.E. 1037 (1907).
46. Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Iowa 553 (1868).
47. City of Independence v. Richardson, 117 Kan. 656, 232 P. 1044 (1925).
48. Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Iowa 553 (1868).
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On the other hand, a boardinghouse is kept principally for the residence of permanent boarders; it is a house where the business of keeping
boarders is generally carried on, and which is held out by the owner or
keeper as a place where boarders are kept.49 The principal difference between a boardinghouse and a lodging house is that the former furnishes
both food and lodging while the latter furnishes only lodging.50 Neither
the boarder nor the lodger acquires an interest entitling him to exclusive
possession of the premises, as does the tenant. 51
Section 419.060 applies the innkeeper's lien only to "the keeper of any
inn, hotel or boardinghouse" and does not mention lodging or rooming
houses.62 The exclusion of lodging houses is consistent with the early common law requirement that meals be served by an inn or hotel. Under this
early view, if a person did not provide food and drink as well as lodging
he would not qualify as an innkeeper and would not be subject to the extraordinary liability of innkeepers.58 Conversely, if he did not rise to innkeeper status and avoided such liability, he was not entitled to the innkeeper's lien. Under the modem view, inns and hotels are not required
to serve meals, 4 but the statute, by including boardinghouses, which by
definition must serve meals, seem to have incorporated the common law requirement of serving meals. Lodging houses, which, by definition, do not
serve meals, have been excluded from coverage. Since section 419.060 includes boardinghouses, its provisions are broader than the common law
lien of innkeepers and are, therefore, in derogation of the common law. 55
Because of this, the court in Jackson found that the provisions must be
strictly construed so that the availability of the lien is limited to those
specifically named in the statute. 56 The court said that if the plaintiff was
found to be a lodger, and not a boarder or guest, a strict construction of
the statute would prevent her from coming within the scope of the statutory lien. She could not be a boarder if she received only lodging without
meals and could not be a guest unless she could be shown to possess the
necessary transient characteristics of a guest.57 The court ruled that the
licensing and inspection ordinance of the City of St. Louis which placed
lodging houses in the same category as hotels and boardinghouses could
in no way affect the scope of coverage under the state statute.58 If the two
were in conflict, the state statute would prevail.
Only keepers of inns, hotels or boardinghouses are entitled to the
statutory lien. There is no common law lien covering lodging houses. If it is
determined by a jury in a subsequent trial of the present case that the defendant was not the keeper of an inn, hotel or boardinghouse vis-a-vis the
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See § 419.060, RSMo 1969, quoted note 3 supra.
53. Metzler v. Terminal Hotel Co., 135 Mo. App. 410, 115 S.W. 1037 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1909).
54. Juengel v. City of Glendale, 164 S.W.2d 610, 613 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
55. Hursh v. Byers, 29 Mo. 469 (1860).
56. 453 S.W.2d at 619.
57. Id. at 618.
58. Id.
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plaintiff, he would have no right to a lien on the property plaintiff kept
in defendant's lodging house. If the jury finds plaintiff was in fact a
lodger, defendant's act of refusing to allow plaintiff to remove her goods
would support an action for wrongful conversion of property. The distinctions between boarders, lodgers, and guests should be kept in mind when
the existence of the statutory lien under section 419.060, RSMo 1969 is in
question, in order to avoid the sort of problem which arose in this case.
JACK H. MORGAN

TAXATION-ADOPTION OF "STRICT NET EFFECT"
TEST UNDER SECTION 302(b) (1)
United States v. Davis1
In 1945, Macklin P. Davis and E. B. Bradley organized a corporation.
Bradley received 500 shares of common stock for his capital contribution to
the corporation, and Davis and his wife each received 250 shares for their
contributions. Shortly after the organization had been completed, Davis
contributed another $25,000 to the corporation in order to increase the corporation's working capital to a level sufficient to qualify it for a loan from
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. In exchange for his investment,
Davis was issued 1,000 shares of non-voting, preferred stock with a par value
of $25 per share, which was to be redeemed by the corporation when the
RFC loan was repaid.2 Subsequently, Davis bought Bradley's 500 shares and
divided them among his son and daughter. By 1963, the corporation had
completed repaying the RFC loan and, in accordance with the original
understanding, redeemed Davis' preferred shares for $25,000.
In his personal income tax return for 1963, Davis treated the redemp'
tion of his stock as a capital transaction under section 302 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. As a result of this treatment, Davis paid no tax on
the transaction because he received the same amount from the redemption
as he had previously invested. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
however, determined that the redemption was "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" and thus taxable as a dividend. Accordingly, Davis paid the tax
and sued for a refund. The federal district court held for Davis.8 The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the redemption
was not essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302 (b) (1) because it was made for legitimate business reasons and not as part of a tax
avoidance scheme. 4 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed.5
The Court decided that the corporate distribution to Davis should be
1. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
2. United States v. Davis, 408 F.2d 1139, 1141 (6th Cir. 1969).

3. Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
4. United States v. Davis, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
5. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
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treated as a dividend under sections 301 and 316 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, unless the transaction came within one of the exceptions
set out in section 302 and thus qualified for the preferential tax treatment
afforded capital gains transactions. Of the four exceptions to the ordinary
income treatment of distributions by a corporation to its shareholders contained in section 302, the Court held only one, section 302 (b) (1), to be
applicable in this case.0 After attributing to Davis the stock owned by his
wife and children pursuant to the rules of constructive ownership in section 318, 7 the Court determined that the redemption was a pro rata distribution by the corporation, and therefore "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" within the meaning of section 302 (b) (1). In reaching this result
the Court adopted a "strict net effect" test for the construction of section
302 (b) (1) and rejected the "flexible net effect" test approved by some of the
lower courts which permits the court to consider the taxpayer's purpose for
the redemption.
An initial question dealt with was the application of the "constructive
ownership rules" to section 302 (b) (1) redemptions. Under section 318 a
shareholder is deemed to be the owner, for some purposes, of shares of
stock owned by members of his family and certain others. 8 Section 302 (c)
makes the constructive ownership rules of section 318 applicable to redemptions under section 302.9 Although several courts of appeals10 and the
Treasury Regulations" had taken the view that rules of constructive owner6. § 302 (b) (1) states that capital gains treatment is available where the distribution is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." § 302 (b) (2) allows capital
is substantially diminished by the
taxpayers
gains
treatment
redemption.
§ 302where
(b) (3)the
allows
capital interest
gains treatment
in cases where the taxpayer
ha s
interest in the corporation completely terminated by the redemption.
with redemptions of certain types of railroad stock. TNT.
§ 302 (b) (4) is concerned
REV. CODE of 1954, § 302.
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 318 (a) (1) (A) provides:
(a) General Rule
For purposes of those provisions of this subchapter to which
the rules contained in this section are expressly made applicable(1) Members of Family(A) In general-an individual shall be considered as
owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly,
by or for(i) his spouse (other than a spouse who is
legally separated from the individual under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance) and
(ii) his children, grandchildren, and parents.
8. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 318.
9. § 302 (c) (1) provides that, with a few exceptions which are not applicable in this case, the rules of § 318 (a) apply "in determining the ownership of
stock for the purpose of this section." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302 (c) (1).
10. United States v. Davis, 408 F.2d 1139, 1142 (6th Cir. 1969); Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1967); Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d
337, 342 (10th Cir. 1966); Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir.
1962); Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 1962).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.302 (b) (1956) states:
The question of whether a distribution in redemption of stock of a shareholder is not essentially equivalent to a dividend under § 302 (b) (1) dePublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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ship apply to cases under section 302 (b) (1), Davis argued that section 318 (a)
did not apply. Davis contended that section 318 (a) applies only to those
provisions of section 302 that refer expressly to stock ownership, and that
since section 302 (b) (1), unlike sections 302 (b) (2) and 302 (b) (3), does not
refer expressly to stock ownership, the attribution rules do not apply to it.
In holding that the rules of constructive ownership are applicable under
section 302 (b) (1), the Court pointed out that to hold otherwise would be
to nullify the effects of sections 302 (b) (2) and 302 (b) (3) since a transaction
that did not qualify for capital treatment under these tightly worded provisions might still qualify under section 302 (b) (1).
A reasonable interpretation of the sections in question leads to the
conclusion that the Court was correct in its application of the rules of constructive ownership in Davis. From the premise that "the rules of 318 (a)
are 'expressly made applicable in determining the ownership of stock' under
section 302 and consequently it is reasonable to apply them whenever ownership is relevant whether by statutory discretion or otherwise,"' 12 the conclusion is reached that the rules of constructive ownership generally apply
in all cases under section 302 (b) (1) where ownership of stock is to be de.
termined. This is the same as the Court determination in Davis that the
rules of section 318 (a) apply to all cases under 302 (b) (1) where stock owner13
ship is to be determined.
The more basic issue in Davis was what effect, if any, should be accorded the taxpayer's legitimate business purpose for the redemption in
determining dividend equivalence under section 302 (b) (1). At the time
the Court handed down this opinion, the federal circuit courts of appeals
were split as to whether the purpose underlying the redemption should be
given any weight in determining if the redemption was "essentially equivalent to a dividend." Several of the courts of appeals, applying a "flexible
net effect" approach, gave at least some weight to the underlying purpose
of the redemption.14 These courts basically took the view that evidence of
a legitimate business purpose should be considered with the other facts of
pends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. One of the facts to
be considered in making the determination is the constructive stock ownership of such shareholders under § 318 (a).
12. B. Brrn-a & J. EusriCm, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
292 n.32 (2d ed. 1966).
13. Perhaps a more just rule of law would have resulted if the Court had
stated that the constructive rules of ownership apply to all cases under section
302 (b) (1) except those instances involving family estrangement situations where
the shareholder has broken all ties with the members of his family who own the
stock under consideration. This was the rule that the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reached for the application of § 318 to cases under § 302 (b) (1).
Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1967). However, in Davis the
Court made no mention of any such possible exceptions. Thus, as a result of Davis,
the rules of constructive ownership of § 318 apply to all redemptions under
SHAREHOLDERS

§302 (b) (1).
14. United States v. Davis, 408 F.2d 1139, 1143 (8th Cir. 1969); Coyle v.
United States, 415 F.2d 488, 491 (4th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v. Berenbaum,
369 F.2d 337, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1966); Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724, 728

(8th Cir. 1966); Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1964); United

States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1958).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5

58

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

the case in reaching the final judgment. Prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a long line of decisions under section 115 (g) (1)
of the 1939 Code had considered the underlying business purpose of a redemption in the dividend equivalence test.15 Because there was no specific
rule stating what constituted a business purpose sufficiently strong to
warrant a capital gains treatment under section 115 (g), the courts decided
each case on its own particular facts.10 Those courts which adopted the socalled "flexible net effect" test in applying section 302 (b) (1) of the 1954
Code followed the basic premise that
in enacting section 302 (b) (1) Congress had intended that the test
for determining whether a redemption was "essentially equivalent
to a dividend" should be the same as the test utilized in interpreting and applying the same words in section 115 (g) (1) of the
1939 Code ....37
Thus, the courts adhering to the "flexible net effect" test to determine the
possible dividend equivalence of a redemption under section 302 (b) (1) of
the 1954 Code considered all the facts of each case, including whether or
not the motivating purpose behind the redemption was a legitimate business purpose.1s
On the other hand, in Levin v. Commissioner'9 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, applying a "strict net effect '20 approach, had taken
the position that the purpose motivating the redemption was irrelevant to
the determination of whether the distribution constituted a dividend.2 ' Instead, the court held in Levin that the determinative factor was whether
15. United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1958); Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838, 841 (3d Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d
607, 610 (5th Cir. 1954); Tucker v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir.
1955); Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692, 695 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Bitker,
The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and PartialLiquidations, 44 CoRMELL L.Q.
299, 301-02 (1959).
16. United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1958); Woodworth
v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719, 723 (6th Cir. 1955).
17. Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 255, 230 (9th Cir. 1964); see also Tabery
v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 422, 427 (9th Cir. 1965).
18. See cases cited note 14 supra.
19. 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967).
20. See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1964) for a definition of the phrase "strict net effect."
21. Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1967). Also, the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit seemed to be close to adopting the view held by
the second circuit. Although never overruled, the test used by that court in Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 1962) (evidence of whether or
not there has been a pro rata distribution is given the most weight in determining
dividend equivalence but other criteria are considered) had undergone a change
during the 1960's. See Wiseman v. United States, 371 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1967), in
which the court stated:
That the transaction was motivated by a legitimate business purpose is not
disputed. But where, as here, the taxpayer is the sole or dominant stockholder of the distributing corporation, motive is irrelevant. For motive
to have any meaningful significance at least the line between shareholder
and the corporation must be more sharply drawn than it is in this case.
Id. at 818.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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there had been a substantial reduction in the shareholder's proportionate
interest in the corporation as a result of the distribution. 22 By adopting the
"strict net effect" test in Levin, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a very limited view of what Congress intended to accomplish by
section 302 (b) (1). Instead of concluding that Congress, by passing section
302 of the 1954 Code, merely intended to re-enact the law as it had been interpreted under section 115 (g) of the 1939 Code (as did the courts which
adopted the "flexible net effect" test), the court in Levin stated that Congress only intended section 302 (b) (1) to apply to those limited cases which
rightfully deserve capital gains treatment and would not qualify under the
exact tests within sections 302 (b) (2) and 302 (b) (3). Thus the court found
the "business purpose" cases were not covered under 302 (b) (1).23 In reaching its decision in Davis, the Supreme Court adopted the "strict net effect"
test for basically the same reasons set forth by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. The Court stated that Congress did not intend for section
302 (b) (1) to have a broad meaning.
A study of the legislative history of the section leads to the conclusion
that Levin and Davis were correct interpretations of Congressional intent.
The report from the House of Representatives on section 302 made no mention of the phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend." 24 The only
situations the House Report stated as warranting capital gains treatment
are those now covered by sections 802 (b) (2) and (3); that is, where the
redemption resulted in an 80% reduction in the shareholder's prior holdings or where the redemption terminated the shareholder's interest com5
pletely.2
22. When a taxpayer's (constructive) ownership decreases by a significant
amount, we are justified in concluding that a substantial reduction in the
taxpayer's interest in the corporation has occurred warranting capital gains
treatment as a sale or exchange. But when only a small reduction in control occurs, the distribution is held to be essentially equivalent to a
dividend....
Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Himmel v.
Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
23. Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1967), in which the
court stated:
The Code draftsmen hopefully expected that the preciseness of the tests

set out in the new provisions, § 302 (b) (2) and § 302 (b) (3), would serve to
relieve the pressure on the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" test
re-enacted as § 302 (b) (1). The new requirements, if carefully observed,
provided safe harbors for taxpayers seeking capital gain treatment. As a
result, their enactment permitted more accurate and long-range planning.

The legislative history of § 302 (b) (1) supports the view that it was designed to play a modest role... . Id. at 525.
See also B. BiTrr._ & J. Eustimm, supra note 12, at 291, which was cited in this
opinion.
24. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35-37 (1954).
25. After stating that under the old Code it was not clear when a redemption
constituted dividend tax liability, and that, therefore, the report would set out
definite conditions which would warrant capital gains treatment, the report continued:
[Y]our committee has defined when a substantially disproportionate redemption of a shareholder's stock will qualify so as not to be taxable as
a dividend; namely, that a particular shareholder's holdings of participathttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss3/5
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It is in the Senate Report that the first mention appears of including
the phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend." It is also in this same
report that it becomes fairly apparent that the Senate did not intend to reenact a rule as expansive as the one which had become the law under section 115 (g) of the 1939 Code. Noting that under the 1939 Code the law
was unclear and that no definite test had developed to determine when a
redemption constituted a capital transaction as opposed to a dividend, the
report stated:
While the House bill sets forth definite conditions under which
stock may be redeemed at capital gain rates, the rules appeared
unnecessarily restrictive, particularly in the case of redemptions of
preferred stock which might be called by the corporation without
the shareholder having any control over when the redemption may
take place. Accordingly, your committee follows the existing law
by reinserting the general language indicating that a redemption
shall be treated as a distribution in part for full payment in exchange for2 6stock if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend.
Referring to this source of legislative history in their treatise, Bittker and
Eustice said:
It is not easy to give section 302 (b) (1) an expansive construction
in view of this indication that its major function was the narrow
one of27immunizing redemptions of minority holdings of preferred
stock.
By adopting the "strict net effect" test in Davis, the Court refused to give
section 302 (b) (1) a construction so expansive that it could be supported
by neither leading commentators 2s nor the language of the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.29
ing stock after the distribution be less than 80% of his holdings before
the distribution. A distribution in complete redemption of a shareholder's
stock will also result in capital gain.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 36 (1954).
26. S. R P. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess. 44, 45 (1954).
27. B. BITTKER K-J. EuSvicn, supra note 12, at 291.
28. Id. at 292-93. Here the authors note that in the light of the legislative
history of § 302 and Treas. Reg. § 1.302 (b), redemptions which are not pro rata
or disproportionate enough to meet the exact standards of § 302 (b) (2) might
qualify for capital gains treatment under § 302 (b) (1) in two possible cases:
) a redemption of part of the stock of a minority shareholder, where
e redemption is not "substantially disproportionate' but his remaining
stake in the corporation is quite limited; ... [and]
(2)pa redemption that is pro rata only because of the constructive ownership rules of § 318, especially if the stock is being attributed from one
member of a family to an independent or hostile adult. Id.
The authors then state that Congressional intent suggests:
"the business purpose" cases of the pre-1954 law are not applicable under
§ 302 (b) (1), except to the extent that a business reason for the reduction
may add strength to the taxpayer's case when the redemption is not pro
rata. Id.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 25; S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 26. In
a more detailed explanation of § 302 (b) (1), the Senate Report stated:
The test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of paragraph
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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With its decision in Davis, the Court has dearly resolved the split of
opinion that had existed among the circuit courts of appeals since the enactment of the 1954 Code as to what constitutes dividend equivalence under
section 302 (b) (1). No longer should any court apply the "flexible net effect" test and thus consider all the facts of each case to determine whether
or not a redemption is "essentially equivalent to a dividencL" Now, under
the "strict net effect" test adopted in Davis, there is ample authority for
holding that a corporate redemption must result in a meaningful reduction
in the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation for it to be
"not essentially equivalent to a dividend" within the meaning of section
302 (b) (1). The effect of Davis is to make less likely the chance that a
shareholder can avoid dividend treatment for a redemption of his stock. In
light of this decision, closely owned corporations would be wise to consider
increasing their working capital by borrowing from the owners rather than
by issuing preferred stock to the owners and later redeeming it. Had Davis
held corporate instruments of debt rather than equity, he would have received his $25,000 as a repayment of a loan and been afforded favorable
tax treatment, completely avoiding treatment of the return as a dividend
for tax purposes. 3 °
EDWIN

J.

SPIEGEL III

(1) is in general that currently employed under § 115 (g) (1) of the 1939
Code. Your committee further intends that in applying this test for the
future that an inquiry will be devoted solely to the question of whether
or not the transaction by its nature may be characterized as a sale of stock
by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation.
For this purpose the presence or absence of earnings and profits is not
material. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 26, at 234.
From this report the Court in Davis inferred that Congress did not intend for
evidence of business purpose to be considered under § 302 (b) (1). The Court reasoned that if, in a redemption situation where there were no corporate earnings
or profits, § 302 (b) (1) was not applicable, then the fact that the redemption was
for legitimate business purposes would be irrelevant because "there would not
likely be a tax avoidance purpose in a situation where there were no earnings or
profits." United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 311-12 (1970)..
30. The Court has previously stated that economic gain to the taxpayer is
the determinative factor in deciding whether or not a payment to the taxpayer
is taxable income. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1960). Following this
reasoning, receipt of a repayment of a loan would not be taxable income because
the taxpayer has received no "economic gain;" all he has received is the return
of what he had previously. See also United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 751
(5th Cir. 1967).
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CONTESTED CASE IN MISSOURI LIQUOR LICENSING
Kopper Kettle Restaurants,Inc. v. City of St. Robert'
Kopper Kettle operates a restaurant in the Ramada Inn in the City
of St. Robert, Missouri. After obtaining a state liquor license for liquor
by the drink, Kopper Kettle applied for a city liquor license as required by
city ordinance. 2 (Such "dual" licensing is a typical feature of the system of
liquor regulation in Missouri.) Kopper Kettle's application for a city license was refused on the ground that there were already ten licenses outstanding, the maximum number allowed by the city ordinance in the absence of a population increase of 250 persons. Kopper Kettle then filed suit
for a writ of mandamus to compel the city to issue the license. In its petition,
Kopper Kettle alleged that it had met all requirements for a city license
because there had been a population increase of 250 persons, which would
allow one license in addition to the ten already outstanding. The city filed
a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations were insufficient to
warrant the issuance of the writ, and the motion was granted. The Springfield Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, stating that if the allegations were taken as true, they were sufficient. 3
A writ of mandamus did not issue on remand because the trial judge
was of the opinion that a suit for "Review of Administrative Action" under
the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act was an adequate remedy which
precluded suit for writ of mandamus under Missouri decisions governing

the availability of that remedy. Kopper Kettle then appeared at a meeting
of the Board of Aldermen and requested a reconsideration of its application,
or a finding of facts setting forth reasons for its refusal. The Board tabled
the request, apparently on the ground that the application had already been
1. 439 S.W.2d I (Spr. Mo. App. 1969).
2. The state gives cities the authority to grant liquor licenses under

§ 311.220(2), RSMo 1969:

The board of Aldermen, city council or other proper authorities of incorporated cities, may... make and enforce ordinances for the regulation
and control of the sale of all intoxicating liquors within their limits,.
where not inconsistent with the provisions of this law.
Although it was not argued in this case, some contend that the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to municipal corporations. The supreme court,
interpreting § 4904, RSMo 1939 [now § 311.220, RSMo 1969], held in State ex rel.
Hewlett v. Womach, 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W.2d 809 (En Banc 1946), that a municipal
ordinance on liquor must be in harmony with the Liquor Control Act, but that
regulation of the number of licenses within a city was not inconsistent with the
state law. The court agreed that a city could not prohibit the sale of liquor in
contravention of state law (in the absence of local option) but that an ordinance
limiting the number of licenses was regulatory, not prohibitive. Id. at 493, 196
S.W.2d at 814. The Hewlett decision was followed in State ex rel. Kopper Kettle
Rest., Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 424 S.W.2d 73 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968), when the
Springfield Court of Appeals reiterated this interpretation. Thus, in liquor control, the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act applies to municipal corporations
which derive their authority to regulate the sale of liquor from the legislature, and
are, therefore, "agencies" under the act.
3. State ex rel. Kopper Kettle Rest., Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 424 S.W.2d 73
(Spr. Mo. App. 1968).
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denied. 4 Kopper Kettle then filed suit in circuit court for "Review of Administrative Action" under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act. The
city moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. When
this motion was denied, the city sought a writ of prohibition, which the
Springfield Court of Appeals declined to issue. 5 The circuit court then decided the case on the merits, holding that it could properly review the administrative decision because it was a "contested case" within the meaning
of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, and found in favor of Kopper Kettle. The city appealed this decision to the Springfield Court of Appeals. Anticlimactically (this being the third time the case came before
that court), the Springfield Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proceeding, after all, was not a "contested case" within the meaning of the
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act. 6
Kopper Kettle had alleged, on appeal, that the issuance of the license
was a "contested case" under section 536.010 (2), RSMo 1959, which defines
a "contested case" as
a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties or
priv'leges of specific
parties are required by law to be determined
7
after hearing.
Kopper Kettle submitted that a hearing is "required by law" when such a
hearing is necessary in order to meet the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Under this criterion a
hearing was required in this case. Kopper Kettle further emphasized, in the
alternative, that even if the controversy was not a "contested case," the appellate court had power to review the decision under section 536.150, RSMo
1959 [now section 536.150, RSMo 1969], which restates the common law
non-statutory review procedure for non-contested cases.
Relying on Missouri decisions which had interpreted "required by
law" to mean "required by statute," s the court rejected Kopper Kettle's
position and held that this proceeding was not a "contested case." Since the
proceeding was not a "contested case" within the meaning of the Missouri
Administrative Procedure Act, the appellate court ruled that the circuit
court had erred in granting review in the first instance. The court further
stated that since Kopper Kettle had treated the entire proceeding as a "contested case," it could not, for the purpose of the appeal, seek review as if it
were a non-contested case. 9 The court thus avoided the question of what
minimum administrative procedural safeguards apply to non-contested
cases.
4. In the interim the city had changed its ordinance to reduce the number
of licenses allowed from 10 to 9.
5. See 439 S.W.2d at 3.
6. Id. at 4.
7. § 536.010 (2), RSMo 1959 [now § 536.010 (2), RSMo 1969].
8. See Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1963); Pinzino v. Supervisor

of Liquor Control, 334 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1960); State ex rel. Leggett v. Jensen, 318

S.W.2d 353 (Mo. En Banc 1958); Scism v. Long, 280 S.W.2d 481 (St. L. Mo. App.

1955).
9. 439 S.W.2d at 4.
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Article V, section 22 of the Missouri Constitution states that any decision by an administrative body is subject to direct review by the courts.
It further states that review will be limited to cases where the agency is required by law to give a hearing of record, and to cases questioning whether
the findings are supported by competent and substantial evidence. 10 The
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act establishes parallel, but not congruent, requirements for proceedings known as "contested cases." In 1953
the act was amended so as to restate common law non-statutory review
procedures appropriate for non-contested cases, i.e., those cases where a
hearing is not required by law.'1
The amended act allows the courts, on appeal, to receive evidence in
the same manner as does an administrative agency in "contested cases"
which do not involve so-called "discretionary functions."'-2 The scope of review is different, nevertheless, depending upon whether the case is contested or non-contested. The legislature has apparently adopted, at least in
part, the view taken by the Missouri Supreme Court in Wood v. Wagner
Electric Corp.'3 The court in that case implied that the scope of review
depends on whether the statutes require a hearing before the agency. If a
hearing is not required (non-contested case), the court may only determine
if the finding was authorized by law. If a hearing is required ("contested
case"), the findings must be supported by "competent and substantial evidence," 4 although the reviewing court may only decide whether the agency
could reasonably find as it did from the evidence. 15 A technical analysis
10. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 22 provides:
All final decisions, findings, rules and orders of any administrative officer
or body existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or
quasi-judicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to direct review
by tie courts as provided by law; and such review shall include the determination whether the same are authorized by law, and in cases in which
a hearing is required by law, whether the same are supported by competent
and substantial evidence upon the whole record.

11. § 536.105, RSMo 1949 [now § 536.150, RSMo 1969].
12. State ex reL. State Tax Comm'n v. Walsh, 815 S.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Mo.

En Banc 1958), contains a discussion of the legislative history and intent of
§ 536.150. The court quoted from a committee comment contained in a report to
the Administrative Law Committee of the Board of Governors of the Missouri
Bar:
This bill.. . provides for the making in court, in a certiorari proceeding,
for example, of the same kind of record that would be made before the
agency in a case reviewable under Section 22 of Article V of the Constitution. Id. at 834.

See also Report of Administrative Law Comm'n of the Mo. Bar, 9 J. Mo. B. 189,
190-91 (1944).
13. 355 Mo. 670, 197 S.W.2d 647 (En Banc 1946). The court stated that the
words "shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law" referred
to the type of review, i.e., certiorari, appeal, etc., and not to the scope of review.
Id. at 674, 197 S.W.2d at 649.
14. Id.
15. In Ellis v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 365 Mo. 614, 285 S.W.2d
634 (En Banc 1955), the supreme court again addressed itself to art. V, § 22 when
it determined that removal from aid to dependent children rolls did not fall under
its provisions. The court held that its provisions did not apply because the aid
was a gratuity, and that previous court decisions indicated a narrower review in
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suggests, therefore, that since the court in a "contested case" must decide
whether the decision is supported by "competent and substantial evidence
on the whole record," the scope of review is broader than in a non-contested
case, where no such requirement is imposed. However, since in a non-contested case the court may, upon an allegation of unreasonableness (to take
one example) "hear such evidence on such question as may be properly
adduced," the court can, in effect, grant de novo review in a non-contested
case.
The court has great latitude in determining what hearings are "required by law." As stated above, Kopper Kettle argued that the phrase
"required by law" comprehends constitutional due process. At this point the
doctrine of "privilege" becomes important. This doctrine, when applied,
dispenses with a hearing requirement and other procedural safeguards of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The argument runs
that when a "vested right" is involved, due process requires a hearing, but
when there is no right, but only a "privilege," there is no violation of due
process if a hearing is not granted. 16 There are exceptions to the "privilege"
doctrine which courts have developed in order to give protection to certain
types of "privileges." These exceptions generally fall into four classes:
(1) that constitutional principles of substantive and procedural
fairness apply even when only a privilege is at stake and even when
the privilege itself is not directly entitled to legal protection;
(2) that privileges as well as rights are entitled to legal protection;
and (3) that when a privilege is combined with another interest
the combination may be a right and accordingly entitled to legal
protection.... The remaining method is (4) to provide legal protection
to a privilege without mentioning the problem of privi7
lege.
Despite a federal trend in the opposite direction, the "privilege" doctrine has been applied to liquor cases in Missouri.' 8 In State v. ParkerDistilling Co.' 9 the court stated that the liquor business was not on the same
plane as other businesses and, unless otherwise provided by statute, a denial
of protections applicable to other businesses is not necessarily a denial of
due process.2 0 Some authors believe that the "privilege" doctrine is a label
these cases than art. V., § 22 provided. Id. at 618, 285 S.W.2d at 687. See Collins
v. Division of Welfare, 864 Mo. 1082, 270 S.W.2d 817 (En Banc 1954); Howlett v.
State Social Security Comm'n, 847 Mo. 784, 149 S.W.2d 806 (En Banc 1941). However, the court stated in Ellis that if a hearing was required the Director of Public
Health and Welfare must make his decision on all the competent evidence produced.
16. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 888 U.S. 537 (1950). See 1
K. DAvis, ADMINSTPATrvE LAW T.arS-ns § 7.11 (1958).
17. 1 K. DAvis, ADmimnSRAArvE LAw TREAnsE § 7.12, at 455 (1958).
18. See State v. Parker Distilling Co., 287 Mo. 103, 189 S.W. 453 (En Banc
1911); State v. Bixman, 162 Mo. 1, 62 S.W. 828 (En Banc 1901).

19. 287 Mo. 103, 139 S.W. 458 (En Banc 1911).
20. See Higgins v. Talty, 157 Mo. 280, 57 S.W. 724 (En Banc 1900) (denial
of a jury trial); State ex rel. Carman v. Ross, 177 Mo. App. 223, 162 S.W. 702
(Spr. Ct. App. 1914) (revocation of liquor license is not a trial but an investigation by county court and only five days notice as provided by statute is required);
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attached after the decision is made. 2 1 Others believe it is an objective factor
logically influential to the court's decision. 22 In any event, the doctrine is
relevant only when the procedural protections of due process are denied to
an existing or would-be licensee. If due process safeguards are present, the
doctrine does not come into play.
The narrow interpretation that the statutory term "hearing required
by law" means "hearing required by statute" for the purpose of identifying
what is a "contested case" can be traced to a decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. Leggett v. Jensen.23 Leggett held that there
was a "contested case" only when a state constitutional provision, a statute,
or a municipal charter or ordinance required that an administrative agency
hold a hearing, and that even though the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment might require a hearing at some stage before the proceedings
become final,2 4 this was not enough to bring a case within the definition
of "contested case" in section 536.010.25
Under this test, whenever an administrative decision is judicially challenged the reviewing court must examine the applicable statutes and ordinances to determine whether a hearing is required. Only when a statute
or ordinance specifically requires such a hearing may the court characterize
the proceeding as a "contested case." 2 6 If the proceeding is not a "contested
case" under this test the courts tend to treat the interest as a "privilge," although they do not always use that exact term. Following his criterion,
the Missouri courts have held that the dismissal of police officers by the
Board of Police Commissioners is a "contested case," 27 but that the sus28
pension of a driver's license is not.
Since the statute which requires licensing for the sale of intoxicating
liquor has been held not to require a hearing, it would appear, under the
rule in Leggett, that
denial of an application for a liquor license is not a
"contested case." 29 The leading decision in the area of liquor control is
and State ex rel. Smith v. Dykeman, 153 Mo. App. 416, 134 S.W. 120 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1911).
21. See, e.g., Byse, Opportunity to Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 57 (1952).
22. See, e.g., 1 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 7.11 (1958).
23. 318 S.W. 2d 353 (Mo. En Banc 1958).
24. See Henry v. Manzella, 356 Mo. 305, 201 S.W.2d 457 (En Banc 1947).
25. The court stated:
The trouble with plaintiffs' contention ...

is that they can point to no

law requiring a hearing on their claim before the Superintendent such as
is required to make it a contested case before him within the meaning of
the Act.
State ex rel. Leggett v. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Mo. En Banc 1958).
26. The pertinent statute for liquor control is § 311.680, RSMo 1969, which
provides that the Supervisor of Liquor Control must hold a hearing to suspend
or revoke a license for the sale of intoxicating liquor. The requirement of a hearing for the revocation or suspension of a license for the sale of non-intoxicating beer
is imposed by § 312.370, RSMo 1969.
27. Scism v. Long, 280 S.W.2d 481 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
28. Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1963).
29. See § 311.210, RSMo 1969. The statute does provide for the Supervisor
to give written reasons for the disapproval of any application.
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State ex rel. Renner v. Noel, 30 decided prior to the effective date of the
Administrative Procedure Act. In Noel, the Missouri Supreme Court held

that the decision of the Supervisor of Liquor Control was final, and that
the statutes did not provide for appeal on writ of error.3 1 The more recent
case of Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control3 2 relied upon the Noel decisina in holding that no hearing was "required by law" when the renewal
of a liquor license was denied.3 3 The supreme court in Pinzino examined
the statutes and concluded that the legislature had drawn a distinction
between the revocation and suspension of licenses, and the issuance and
renewal of licenses. The court reasoned that since the legislature had required a hearing in revocation and suspension cases, and had not required
a hearing in cases involving the denial of issuance or renewal, a hearing was
not essential when the Supervisor refused to issue a license.3 4 Thus, denial of
either renewal or issuance of a liquor license is not a "contested case" under
the narrow reasoning of the Missouri Supreme Court.
In opposition to this approach Kopper Kettle cited Hornsby v.Allen, 35
a federal court of appeals decision by the fifth circuit. In Hornsby the City
of Atlanta had failed to give reasons for denying a liquor license application.
The applicant alleged that the city violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), which
allows civil tort relief for the deprivation of any right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the "Constitution and laws." 36 The applicant alleged that she
was denied equal protection and due process under the fourteenth amendment in that she was not granted a hearing or given a reason for the denial
of her application. The court held that the fundamental principles of due
process were applicable to the issuance of liquor licenses, and that those
principles required a hearing to be held. The court found no difference between the issuance of a license, and the revocation or suspension of a license.
The court stated that the lower court should not decide whether the Board
of Aldermen should issue the license but should only insure that considera30. 346 Mo. 286, 140 S.W.2d 57 (En Banc 1940).
31. The Supervisor in Noel had refused a license on the ground that the
applicant was not of good moraI character. The applicant filed for a writ of
mandamus against the Supervisor. The court held that mandamus normally would
not lie, unless the Supervisor refused to issue the license after he had resolved all

discretionary decisions in favor of the applicant and the issuance of the license
was therefore only a ministerial duty.
32. 334 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1960).
33. Chapter 312, RSMo 1969, regulates non-intoxicating beer, while ch. 311,
RSMo 1969 regulates non-intoxicating liquor. Pinzino was decided under §§ 312.120
and 312.370, RSMo 1959 [now §§ 312.120 and 312.370, RSMo 1969]. However,
these sections are identical to §§ 311.210 and 311.680, R.SMo 1969.
34. Pinzino, apparently, was not brought under ch. 536, RSMo 1959 [now
ch. 536, RSMo 1969]. The court never addressed itself to the definition of a
"contested case."
35. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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tions of due process control disposition of the application.3 7 Thus, Hornsby
might be applied to the Missouri definition of "contested case" because
the Hornsby court inferred that "required by law" includes required by
due process, and that due process requires a hearing in cases where issuance
of a liquor license is denied.
Since the denial of a liquor license involves the denial of substantial
rights to the applicant, there is logically no basis for the distinction between
issuance, renewal, revocation and suspension which the Missouri Supreme
Court made in Pinzino. In Kopper Kettle, however, the Springfield Court
of Appeals rejected Hornsby and relied on Pinzino. The court also relied
on Wilson v. Morris38 in which the Missouri Supreme Court held that in
non-contested cases only a summary opportunity to be heard, rather than
an evidentiary hearing, is required by due process. The court stated that,
so long as there has been such an opportunity sometime before proceedings
become final, due process is not violated.3 9 Section 536.150, RSMo 1969,
seems to provide this opportunity.40 In conjunction with this, it was held
in State ex rel. Leggett v. Jensen- that section 536.105, RSMo 1949, [now
section 536.150, RSMo 1969], which provides for the taking of evidence in
circuit court in non-contested cases, dearly satisfies this requirement.4 2 This
position is supported by the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Bouriois,Inc. v. Chapman.4 3
Viewed in this light, Kopper Kettle suffered the fate formerly reserved
for litigants operating within systems of strict common law pleading, under
which the election of the wrong remedy was fatal to the plaintiff's cause.
Thus, Kopper Kettle was required, at its peril, to submit to a circuit court
determination on the merits in accordance with the circuit court's view that

37. The applicant further alleged that her application was denied because the
alderman for her ward did not approve. If this were true it would have made the
denial arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and discriminatory. Beauregard v.
Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964), held that there was no counterpart
to § 1983 in state courts; therefore, any action relying on Hornsby must be brought
in federal court.
38. 369 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1963).
39. See Henry v. Manzella, 356 Mo. 305, 201 S.W.2d 457 (En Banc 1947).
40. It has been argued that § 536.150 gives too narrow a scope of review to
insure due process and, therefore, "required by law" should be expanded to include due process cases, using the rationale in Hornsby. It is the author's opinion
that this section is not too narrow. § 536.150 provides (in part):
[T]he court may determine whether [the] decision ...is unconstitutional,
unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves an abuse of
discretion....
See Morell v. Harris, 418 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1967); Blydenberg v. David, 413 S.W.2d
284 (Mo. En Banc 1967). See also Mo. CONST. art. V., § 22, quoted note 10 supra.
41. 318 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. En Banc 1958).
42. In State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. En Banc
1958), the court cited the Administrative Law Committee of the Missouri Bar Association in showing the legislative intent in passing § 536.150, RSMo 1969. These
comments indicate that the legislature was seeking to prevent the denial of due
process by setting up a procedure for review of non-contested cases.
43. 301 U.S. 183 (1937). The Court held that a Maine statutory provision for
judicial appeal from the agency decision was an ample safeguard of due process,
even though there was no hearing before the agency.
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the proceeding was a "contested case" and governed by the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act's provisions applicable thereto, or to challenge
the circuit court's characterization of the proceeding as a "contested case,"
which, in retrospect, would have succeeded, but which would have had the
effect of delaying, once again, an adjudication on the merits of Kopper Kettle's license eligibility.
Taking the foregoing into account, and considering that the city had
amended its ordinances (following the initial mandamus victory) to provide for only nine licenses instead of ten, the federal remedy would seem
conspicuously appropriate. The circumstance of the reduction in the number of authorized licenses would permit an inference of discrimination
against Kopper Kettle. This, in turn, under the authority of Hornsby,
clearly suggests an action in federal court for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
WARREN D.
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